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SALES TAXATION OF CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS IN
MARYLAND
NEAL D. BORDEN*
A significant area of legal practice involves the planning and
effectuation of capital transactions. These transactions include
the formation and dissolution of partnerships, the formation,
merger and liquidation of corporations, the sale of business assets
and the sale of corporate stock. Although the income tax aspects
of capital transactions are a predictable concern for both coun-
selor and client, it is highly unlikely that either would give much
thought to the effect of a retail sales tax. However, since the 1969
amendment' to the Maryland Retail Sales Tax Act,2 as inter-
preted by a 1972 opinion of the Attorney General of Maryland,3
this tax has become an item of concern to both the attorney and
his client.4 This amendment effectively removed the only provi-
sion by which most capital transactions were ordinarily exempted
from sales taxation. That exemption, appearing in section 326(e)
of the Act, previously excluded from taxation casual and isolated
sales of otherwise taxable property, but now applies only to trans-
actions for $1,000 or less. This poses a difficult and somewhat
unique statutory and administrative situation. One direct conse-
quence of this amendment is the newly created problem faced by
each attorney as to whether or not this tax applies. Further ques-
* Partner, Venable, Baetjer & Howard, Baltimore, Maryland; A.B., 1963, Harvard
University; L.L.B., 1966, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Ch. 424, [1969] Md. Laws 1060-61.
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 324-71 (Supp. 1972). This legislation will hereinafter
be referred to as the Act.
3. The Daily Record (Baltimore), Apr. 8, 1972, at 4, col. 2. The opinion is issued
over the signatures of Attorney General Burch and Assistant Attorney General Rubin, and
is directed to Henry A. Heinmuller, Jr., the Director of the Retail Sales Tax Division of
the Comptroller's Office. The opinion was issued in response to questions raised by Mr.
Heinmuller on the application of the sales tax to several transactions involving the trans-
fer of all of the assets of a going business.
4. The problems reviewed in this article are highlighted in Report of the Section of
Taxation of the Maryland State Bar Association, 5 MD. B. J. 18 (Jan. 1973).
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tions arise as to what arguments can be made against its levy and
whether or not a transaction can be designed to avoid it.
For those who assumed that a retail sales tax by its very
terms could never apply to capital transactions' this may seem
to be a peculiar and unnecessary analysis. It is unquestionable,
however, that retail sales taxes have always applied to a number
of transactions which are neither commonly understood as sales
nor usually considered as having been made at retail.
Such taxes are regularly applied to non-consumer transac-
tions. As long ago as 1938 it was noted that the imposition of a
sales tax on non-consumer sales resulted in "an objectionable
'double' or multiple taxation of goods as an object of consumers'
expenditures," and that very few of the state sales taxes then in
effect contained language which prevented the imposition of a
double tax.' In fact, many defined "retail sales" in such a manner
as to tax many transactions which were not sales by retailers to
5. There are a number of types of sales taxes, including retail sales taxes, general
sales taxes, gross receipts taxes and gross income taxes. Since the Maryland statute deals
with retail sales taxes, only that type of tax will be considered in this article. Retail sales
taxes have been described as "pre-eminently taxes on margins" and "normally based upon
retail sales of tangible personal property and the furnishing of certain services to consum-
ers." N. JACOBY, RETAIL SALES TAXATION 7, 12 (1938) [hereinafter cited as JACOBY]. The
retail sales tax has been described as a "uniform tax on consumer expenditures" and it
has been noted that in Maryland and seventeen other states, the retail sales tax is "basi-
cally a consumer levy, imposed upon the retail sale." J. DUE, STATE AND LOCAL SALES
TAXATION 24-25 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DUE].
The emergence of the retail sales tax as a means for raising revenue by the states can
be directly attributed to the depression of the 1930's. As of mid-1932, general sales taxes
were in effect in only six states, and in only two were they significant sources of revenue.
By the close of 1937, general sale taxes were in effect in twenty-seven states, New York
City and the District of Columbia. JACOBY at 71. As of 1971, forty-five states had adopted
a sales tax, and the retail sales tax is the most significant source of state tax revenue today.
DUE at 1.
It is interesting to note that sales taxes are not a twentieth century concept. Sales
taxes were extensively applied in the kingdoms of the ancient world and in medieval
Europe; perhaps the most famous of the historical examples is the tax known as the
"Alcabala" employed by Spain subsequent to the thirteenth century and described by
Adam Smith in WEALTH OF NATIONS. JACOBY at 12. Some of the earliest United States taxes
which might be called sales taxes were the mercantile license taxes imposed in Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia and Delaware as far back as the latter part of the eighteenth century. See
DUE at 2.
The West Virginia gross sales tax, first effective in 1921, has been described as the
first comprehensive and fiscally important sales tax in the United States. The first state
to levy a retail sales tax at a substantial rate was Mississippi, which imposed such a tax
in April, 1932. JACOBY at 61. See also R. HAIG and C. SHOUP, THE SALES TAX IN THE
AMERICAN STATES (1934). This work, which at the time of its publication was the pre-
eminent treatise on sales taxation, contains extensive surveys of the type of sales tax
legislation then being adopted throughout the country.
6. JACOBY, supra note 5, at 127.
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ultimate consumers.7 There is no question that this situation con-
tinues to exist, perhaps even more so at the present time than in
1938.1
A collection of articles recently published by the Tax Insti-
tute of America includes a paper which discusses this aspect of
sales taxation in the context of an analysis of neutrality in busi-
ness taxation.' The author notes that the sales tax applies to
many business purchases, estimating that fifteen percent to
twenty-five percent of the average state's sales tax collections
originate in the business sector. He comments:
If we adopt the traditional textbook concept of the sales
tax as a single-stage tax on consumption, then it is a mis-
take-a departure from neutrality-to include any business
purchases in the tax base;..To do so is to add a second layer
of tax on those goods that require taxed inputs for their
production. This viewpoint leads to the conclusion that all
business purchases-raw materials, physical ingredients,
machinery and equipment, office supplies, and so on-
should be exempt.
But there is another conception of the sales tax that
seems to me to conform more closely to the actual practice
of sales tax states. This conceives the sales tax as a single-
stage tax on all private purchases of final products. Viewed
this way the sales tax, to be neutral, should be levied on
business purchases of final products the same as on con-
sumer purchases. Only nonfinal products would escape. In
this form, the sales tax seems . . . to resemble closely the
value-added tax of the 'gross product' type-in common with
the value-added tax it would tax all final products uni-
formly, thereby scoring high on neutrality."0
Assuming then that the Act can tax capital transactions in
Maryland, let us consider some of the consequences. Suppose
your client, A, decides to expand his artificial paper flower busi-
ness, Flower Products. He wants to take in a partner, B, who will
also bring to the endeavor materials, equipment and the neces-
7. Id.
8. This is made abundantly clear by the most comprehensive recent survey of state
sales taxation, which appears in SPECIAL SuB-COMMITtEE ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE OF THE COMMITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SALES AND USE TAXES, H.R. REP. No. 565,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Pages 743-46 are of particular relevance to this point.
9. F. Stocker, State and Local Taxation of Business: An Economist's Viewpoint, in
BUSINESS TAXES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 37, 43 (1972).
10. Id. at 43.
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sary expertise for the production of plastic artificial flowers. If A
and B form a new partnership to which they transfer all of their
business assets in exchange for equal partnership interests under
present Maryland law, a sales tax might possibly be due. The
transfer of manufacturing equipment and office furniture will be
considered as a taxable sale if its value exceeds $1,000.
To go one step further, perhaps A and B soon thereafter wish
to incorporate as Flower, Inc. While this could readily be done in
an income-tax-free manner, the transfer of furniture and equip-
ment in exchange for stock might be subject to the sales tax. In
the event that Flower, Inc. grew and prospered, and was subse-
quently acquired by a conglomerate, General Gardens Corp., the
sales tax might again be a factor to consider. On a merger into
General Gardens or one of its subsidiaries, or on a sale of assets,
a sales tax might be due which Flower, Inc. would be required to
collect. Taking a dimmer view of its future, the liquidation of
Flower, Inc. could also generate a taxable sale, as could its disso-
lution as a partnership.
It should be apparent that in a substantial capital transac-
tion, the sales tax can be a very significant item which would add
a considerable sum to the cost of the transaction. Where outside
parties are involved, for example in a merger or acquisition, fail-
ure to give proper consideration to sales tax liability might well
jeopardize the business combination. On the other hand, where
a proprietorship becomes a partnership, or a partnership a corpo-
ration, failure to recognize sales tax liability could lead to prob-
lems with clients, if they are later audited and assessed the tax
and penalties.
THE MARYLAND RETAIL SALES TAX ACT
At this point, an analysis of the Act is in order. The Act" was
originally adopted in 1947,12 and its basic taxing provision ap-
pears in section 325, which states that "[flor the privilege of
selling certain tangible personal property at retail as defined
above . . . a vendor shall collect from the purchaser a tax at the
rate specified in this section on the price of each separate retail
11. All subsequent references are to sections of the Maryland Retail Sales Tax Act
as codified in article 81.
12. Md. Retail Sales Tax Act Ch. 281, [1947] Md. Laws 430. For a very brief period
of time (1935-36) an Emergency Gross Receipts Tax was in effect in Maryland pusuant
to ch. 188, [1935] Md. Laws 405, and appeared as a subtitle to article 56, "Licenses", of
the Maryland Annotated Code.
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sale made in this State . .. "I' The definitions of the terms used
in the Act appear in section 324; the cross-referencing contained
in these definitions, however, makes any analysis somewhat cir-
cular. 4
The exemptions appear in section 326, and the exemption for
casual and isolated sales is contained in section 326(e), which
provides:
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 325 (1969).
14. The following definitional subsections of section 324 are relevant:
(b) 'Vendor' means any person selling property or rendering services upon the sale
of which a tax is imposed under § 325 of this subtitle.
(c) 'Purchaser' means any person who purchases tangible personal property or to
whom services are rendered, which are taxable under § 325 of this subtitle.
(d) 'Sale' and 'selling' mean any transaction whereby title or possession, or both,
of tangible personal property is or is to be transferred by any means whatsoever for
a consideration including rental, lease or license to use, or royalty, by a vendor to
a purchaser. . . . Such consideration may be either in the form of a price in money,
rights or property or by exchange or barter, and may be payable immediately, in
the future, or by installments ...
(e) 'Tangible personal property' means corporeal personal property of any nature.
(f) 'Retail sale' and 'sale at retail' shall mean the sale in any quantity or quantities
of any tangible personal property or service taxable under the terms of this subtitle.
Said term shall mean all sales of tangible personal property to any person for any
purpose other than those in which the purpose of the purchaser is (i) to resell the
property so transferred in the form in which the same is, or is to be received by him,
(ii) to destroy the property so transferred in the manufacturing, assembling, pro-
cessing or refining of other tangible personal property to be produced for sale or in
the generation of electricity, or (iii) to use or incorporate the property so transferred
as a material or part, or [sic] other tangible personal property to be produced for
sale by manufacturing, assembling, processing or refining . . . . For the purpose
of the tax imposed by this subtitle, the term 'sale at retail' shall include but shall
not be limited to the following:
(6) Sales of tangible personal property and/or services to any person who will
use the same as facilities, tools, tooling, machinery or equipment (including, but
not limited to dies, molds, and patterns) even though such person intends to trans-
fer and/or does transfer title to such property or service either before or after such
person uses the facilities, tools, tooling, machinery, or equipment.
(i) 'Price' means the aggregate value in money of any thing or things paid or
delivered, or promised to be paid or delivered by a purchaser to a vendor in the
consummation and complete performance of a retail sale without any deduction
therefrom on account of the cost of materials used, labor or service cost, or any other
expense whatsoever. . ..
(j) 'Business' means any activity engaged in by any person or caused to be
engaged in by him with the object of gain, benefit or advantage, either direct or
indirect.
(k) 'Engaging in business' means commencing, conducting, or continuing in
business, as well as liquidating a business when the liquidator thereof holds himself
out to the public as conducting such a business.
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The tax hereby levied shall not apply to the following
sales:
(e) Casual sale. Casual and isolated sales by a vendor
who is not regularly engaged in the business of selling tangi-
ble personal property provided, however, that this exemp-
tion shall not apply to casual sales for amounts of $1,000 or
more, and/or which are made through an auctioneer or other
regular dealer. 5
The tax must be separately stated and charged at the time
of sale, and it must be paid by the purchaser to the vendor as
trustee for the state. 6 The vendor is liable for the collection of the
tax, and any officer of a corporate vendor is personally liable for
its collection." Section 331(a) requires the purchaser to pay the
tax directly to the Comptroller.,if the vendor fails to collect it. s
Failure to file a return or pay the tax creates liability for a ten-
percent penalty and interest of one-half of one percent per month
or fraction thereof until payment.'9 Where any attempt to defraud
has occurred, a one-hundred percent penalty can be imposed,2
and wilful failure to collect or pay the tax, or its wilful evasion,
can subject any taxpayer or officer of a corporate taxpayer to a
fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both.2'
Returning briefly to the example discussed above, we can
now point to the statutory provision which would exempt a trans-
fer of inventory or raw materials such as paper, wire, paste or raw
15. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 326(e) (1969).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 327 (1969) provides:
Upon each taxable sale or service the tax to be collected . . . . shall be paid
by the purchaser to the vendor as trustee for and on account of the State, and the
vendor shall be liable for the collection thereof for and on account of the State.
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 328 (1969) provides in pertinent part:
The vendor and any officer of any corporate vendor shall be personally liable
for the tax collected or required to be collected under this subtitle. . . . Any vendor
who fails to collect the tax, and any officer of a corporate vendor which fails to
collect the tax . . . shall, in addition to all other penalties, be personally liable to
the State for the amount uncollected.
18. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 331(a) (1969) states:
Where a purchaser has failed to pay or a vendor has failed to collect a tax ...
then . . . such tax shall be payable by the purchaser directly to the Comptroller,
and the purchaser shall file a return thereof with the Comptroller and pay the tax
imposed. . . . When any corporate vendee fails to pay the tax. . then in addition
to the liability of such corporate vendee, the officers, or any of them, of such
corporation shall be personally liable. . ..
19. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 344(a) (1969).
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 344(b) (1969).
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 369 (1969).
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plastic from A and B to their new partnership, and from there to
a corporation.22 Unfortunately, no exemption is now available for
the equipment used to manufacture the flowers, the office sup-
plies and the furnishings, nor for other items of personal property
which are used in the business but not held for resale or consumed
in the production process, to the extent they exceed $1,000 in
value.
Furthermore, the definitions of "sale," "retail sale" and
''price" leave little doubt on their face that transfers of personal
property in exchange for corporate stock or a partnership interest
might be included under the Act. Similarly, transfers by merger,
liquidation or dissolution can also fall within its terms. The only
applicable exception is the casual sale exemption, which is set
forth above.
Thus, if A and B have $200,000 of flower-making machinery
and $50,000 of office equipment and supplies, sales taxes of $6,000
would appear to be payable upon the transfer thereof to a newly
formed partnership or corporation. Merger into General Gardens
Corp. would create an equal liability for General, and a liquidat-
ing distribution of these assets could leave A and B with the same
tax liability. It is clear that none of this would have been true in
the ordinary course of business in Maryland prior to 1969. The
need for the Bar to consider these possibilities is only slowly be-
coming apparent. The serious economic consequences, though,
make it mandatory that practitioners become familiar with the
Act as well as its regulatory and judicial embellishments.
THE 1969 AMENDMENT
The amendment to the casual sale exemption, 3 which is the
impetus for this discussion, was enacted by the General Assembly
in its 1969 Session, effective July 1, 1969. Prior to the amend-
ment, this section exempted:
Casual and isolated sales by a vendor who is not regularly
engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property
and the use of an auctioneer shall not make a sale taxable
which otherwise is not taxable under this sub-section.2 4
22. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,§ 324(f) (1969).
23. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 326(e) (1969).
24. Ch. 55, [1958] Md. Laws 196. The amending legislation was introduced by
Senators Meyer Emanuel of Price George's County and Charles Smelser of Carroll County,
as Senate Bill No. 226. The amendment resulted from the work of the Special Joint
Legislative Council Executive Committee on the Maryland Sales, Use, and Admissions
1973]
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The amending legislation provided that the casual and iso-
lated sale exemption was limited to sales amounting to $1,000 or
less. This amendment resulted from the work of a Special Joint
Legislative Council Executive Committee on the Maryland Sales,
Use, and Admissions Taxes, which submitted a report of the re-
sults to the Governor and Legislative Council.
The report of the Committee is not particularly clear as to
the purpose for the enactment of this amendment. In a list
headed "Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations," item
eighteen reads as follows:
Casual sales are exempt under Maryland's law only because
of the fact that the tax would be difficult or, in some cases,
impossible to collect. On the other hand this exemption rep-
resents inequitable treatment of taxpayers and increases the
possibility of tax evasion. The Committee recommends that
all such sales made through auctioneers be taxed and that
all casual sales over $1,000 be subject to the tax if otherwise
taxable.25
Following this apparent conclusion is a reference to a section
entitled "Sales by Certain Vendors or to Certain Purchasers"."
The opening sentences and item two of this portion of the Com-
mittee Report read as follows:
Certain organizations have been granted exemptions
under the Maryland Sales Tax law when they are vendors
and/or when they are purchasers. These exemptions are
listed below with the Committee's action on each:
2. Casual and Isolated Sales by a vendor who is not
regularly engaged in the business of selling tangible personal
property. Specifically stated is 'the use of an auctioneer shall
Taxes (hereinafter referred to as the Committee), which was chaired by Senator Emanuel,
and on which Senator Smelser served. The Committee was created pursuant to House
Joint Resolution No. 66 of the General Assembly of 1968, directing the appointment of
such a committee to conduct an in-depth study of these taxes. The report of the Commit-
tee was submitted to the Governor and the Legislative Council on November 27, 1968 and
is reprinted in MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1968-69 Part
2 499-545 [hereinafter referred to LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT]. The legislation which
was ultimately introduced as Senate Bill No. 226 appears as Exhibit I to the Committee's
report, at page 542 of the LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT. This bill was later enacted on May
2, 1969. See Ch. 424, [1969] Md. Laws 1060-61.
25. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REP. supra note 24, at 503 (emphasis added).
26. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REP. supra note 24, at 515.
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not make a sale taxable which otherwise is not taxable under
this subsection.'
The exemption of such sale appears to have some justifi-
cation, for the collection of the tax on many casual sales
might be difficult to administer or enforce. On the other
hand, testimony presented to the Committee suggests that
considerable revenue is being lost through failure to impose
the tax upon sales of items such as mobile homes. Imposition
of the tax upon casual sales of this item alone could possibly
produce as much as $100,000 in added revenue. It was sug-
gested that it would be more feasible to administer the tax
on casual sales if applied to large items.
The Committee accordingly recommends that the cas-
ual sale exemption provision in the Code be amended to
remove (1) all sales made through auctioneers or other regu-
lar dealers and (2) all sales over $1,000.2
It should be noted that there appears nowhere in this discussion
the reference to taxation of sales only if they are "otherwise taxa-
ble", which is the language used in the summary quoted above.
In the letter of transmittal accompanying the Committee's
report,28 its chairman, Senator Emanuel stated that "[a] point
to make abundantly clear to all readers is that this report basi-
cally was not intended to, nor does it make recommendation for
any increase in the taxes we have studied. Without a clearly
demonstrable need for additional revenues at this time, we feel
that no such recommendation would be appropriate." Rather,
Senator Emanuel pointed to the Joint Resolution creating the
Committee, which sought an investigation of the equity, eco-
nomic effects, compliance, and administration of the taxes with
which the Committee was concerned. Vigorous imposition of the
sales tax pursuant to the Attorney General's Opinion,2 as it in-
terprets the recent amendment, would quite probably generate
substantial revenues, and one might argue that there would have
been some mention of this aspect of the proposed amendment in
the Committee report, if the Committee had intended to tax such
transactions. Unfortunately, the legislative history is extraordi-
narily scanty and, in fact, consists entirely of the materials
quoted herein. There is not sufficient basis to support any posi-
tive conclusions, and the language of the statute in question is so
27. Id.
28. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REP. supra note 24, at 501.
29. The Daily Record (Baltimore), Apr. 8, 1972, at 4, col. 2.
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clear that it is difficult to believe any court would turn to the
legislative history.
While it is probable that the members of the Committee who
considered this issue were concerned with the imposition of tax
on the casual sale of substantial items of personal property, such
as mobile homes sold on an irreguar basis by individuals, they
accomplished this by the adoption of legislation which is far
broader in scope than would have been necessary to reach the
desired result.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Exemptions from sales taxation for what have been termed
"casual and isolated sales" may be created by legislative enact-
ment-either through a definitional exemption or a specific ex-
emption, by judicial interpretation of the taxing statute or by
administrative rulings. In the past, the Maryland courts have
held that capital transactions are exempt only because of the
casual and isolated sale exemption 0 To furnish a complete pic-
ture of the manner in which the Maryland Court of Appeals will
probably treat the exemption as amended, it is necessary to re-
view the past construction by the court of both the exemption,
as stated prior to 1969, and the Act as a whole.
The Act has been viewed as an all-encompassing taxing mea-
sure which is applicable to all transactions within its scope, with
the exception of those qualifying under specifically delineated
exemptions or those which fall outside the Act by virtue of a
definition of terms. It has accordingly been very strictly applied.
Two decisions by the Maryland Court of Appeals are of particular
interest in this analysis since they emphasize the statutory
scheme of the Act and the manner in which it has been inter-
preted. These cases are Central Credit v. Comptroller,3' and
Comptroller v. American Cyanamid Co.,32 both of which concern
the scope of exemptions from the retail sales tax.
In Central Credit, the appellant credit union argued that it
was exempt from the tax under a statutory exemption since it was
a non-profit organization, even though it conceded that it was not
30. See, e.g., Comptroller v. Thompson Trailer Corp., 209 Md. 490, 121 A.2d 850
(1956); Comptroller v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 223 Md. 384, 164 A.2d 886
(1960). See also notes 44-50 infra and accompanying text.
31. 243 Md. 175, 220 A.2d 568 (1966).
32. 240 Md. 491, 214 A.2d 596 (1965).
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a religious, charitable or educational organization." The court,
upholding the Comptroller in refusing an exemption, found that
the exemption for sales to non-profit organizations was limited
strictly to sales to the organizations specifically identified in the
statute. The opinion states:
Section 333 [of the Act] expressly provides that it shall
be presumed that all sales of tangible and personal property
and services set forth in the subtitle are subject to tax until
the contrary is established. Section 326 entitled 'Exemp-
tions' states that the tax shall not apply to certain sales.
As Judge Markell said, for the Court, in Comptroller of
Treasury v. Crofton Co., 198 Md. 398, 404, 94 A.2d 86
(1951): 'We must apply the familiar rules that an exemp-
tion from taxation must be strictly construed and to doubt
is to deny the exemption.'34
This decision makes it clear that all transactions involving sales
as defined in the Act are subject to tax, in the absence of a
specific exemption explicitly covering the transaction in question.
The American Cyanamid case involves a more complicated
set of facts, dealing with an exemption arising from the defini-
tions of the Act rather than from the statutory exemptions them-
selves. The appellee was a manufacturer of adhesives, and it
sought to have excluded from retail sales taxation aluminum pur-
chased for, and rendered completely unuseable by, the testing of
batches of adhesives. The appellee relied on the theory that the
aluminum was "consumed" in the process of the manufacturing
operation and was therefore non-taxable pursuant to the defini-
tion of retail sale in section 324(f)35 as interpreted by rule 63 of
the Comptroller.3 6 This definition excludes the transfer of prop-
erty for use or incorporation as a material or part of other tangible
33. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 326(i) (1969) provides that the tax does not apply to
"sales to any person operating a nonprofit religious, charitable, or educational institution
or organization . . . when such tangible personal property is purchased for use in carrying
on the work of such institution or organization .... "
34. 243 Md. at 178-79, 220 A 2d. at 570-71.
35. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 324(f) (1969) provides, inter alia, that the term "retail
sale" does not include property purchased to be destroyed in manufacturing, assembling,
processing or refining. The section then states: "Tangible personal property shall be
considered to be destroyed in manufacturing, processing, assembling, refining or in the
generation of electricity if it is changed in nature by reason of its use in a relatively short
period of time ....
36. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, TAX LAWS AND REGULATIONS, Maryland Retail
Sales and Use Tax Acts with Rules and Regulations, rule 63, at 65,013.
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personal property to be produced for sale by manufacturing. Rule
63 stated that property consumed in manufacturing operations
was included within this provision. The court, however, found
that this rule was an extension of the statute, and held that
consumption was not the same as use or incorporation.
Throughout the opinion it was emphasized that where the
language of the statute is clear and plain, there is no room for any
interpretation, either administrative or judicial. Where there was
"no ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute," there was "no need
to look beyond its words to find its meaning. ' 37 The court cited
the language of Stembler & Ford, Inc. v. Capitol Heights,31 in
which the court said of a taxing statute, "[I]f the language is
plain and free from ambiguity and has a definite and sensible
meaning, such is conclusively presumed to be the meaning of the
legislative body in enacting the statute or ordinance."
While Judge Barnes filed a very lengthy dissent, arguing that
there was ambiguity in the statute and that the rule was a proper
interpretation, he further reiterated the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals' approach to exemptions in tax statutes. Judge Barnes cited
Suburban Propane Gas Corp. v. Tawes,40 quoting as follows:
Of course, tax exemption statutes are to be strictly con-
strued in favor of the State. The taxing power is never pre-
sumed to be surrendered. Every assertion that it has been
relinquished must, to be effective, be distinctly supported by
clear and unambiguous legislative enactment. To doubt an
exemption is to deny it."
Thus, any argument not directed toward the specific wording
of the statute would appear to be fruitless. A strict interpretation
of the taxing statute will be applied and the tax will be imposed
on any capital transaction falling within its terms which does not
meet the dollar limitation . 2 Any attempt to expand the language
of that section through litigation will probably fail, given the
37. 240 Md. at 505, 214 A.2d at 604.
38. 221 Md. 113, 156 A.2d 430 (1959).
39. Id. at 117, 156 A.2d at 432.
40. 205 Md. 83, 106 A.2d 119 (1954).
41. 240 Md. at 517, 214 A.2d. at 611.
42. Other cases interpreting the language and scope of the Act give slight comfort
in the face of those decisions construing its exemptive provisions. See, e.g., Frank J. Klein
v. Comptroller, 233 Md. 490, 197 A.2d 243 (1964) (the Act is "a true sales tax"); Comptrol-
ler v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 227 Md. 252, 176 A.2d 210 (1961); Comptroller
v. Aerial Products, Inc., 210 Md. 627, 124 A.2d 805 (1956) (purpose of Act is to impose
tax on "final purchaser or ultimate consumer", avoiding a pyramiding effect).
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attitude of the Court of Appeals; the language is quite clear, and
it would undoubtedly be construed narrowly to mean just what
it appears to say. Similarly, any attempt to secure an exemption
through other means-as through a construction of the defini-
tional provisions of section 324-could also fail for the same rea-
sons.
Any belief that the Maryland Court of Appeals would not
apply the sales tax to capital transactions on "policy" grounds is
cast in doubt by its only four decisions which specifically deal
with such transactions. The first and possibly most important
is Comptroller v. Thompson Trailer Corp.43 In that case the ap-
pellee Thompson had purchased all of the machinery, equipment
and real estate owned by a partnership known as Maryland Engi-
neering Company in Pikesville, Maryland, in 1951. The purchase
price was $250,000 for all of the tangible assets of Engineering,
with the exception of raw materials, work in progress and finished
products. Engineering had been in the woodworking business,
producing cabinets and doors. Thompson was in the business of
manufacturing trailer and truck bodies. On the purchase,
Thompson assigned a value of $50,000 to the personal property.
The Comptroller assessed a deficiency for sales tax with respect
to the purchase of personal property, Thompson appealed to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County and the assessments were
cancelled. The Court of Appeals affirmed that order.
Thompson argued that the transaction was covered by the
casual and isolated sale exemption and also came within the
terms of Comptroller's rule 39, which at that time provided that
a sale of fixtures and equipment in conjunction with a complete
liquidation of a business was to be considered a casual and iso-
lated sale." The court, in an opinion by Judge Hammond, noted
43. 209 Md. 490, 121 A.2d 850 (1956).
44. Pursuant to section 365(a) of the Act, the Comptroller is authorized to make
"such rules and regulations as he shall deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this
subtitle and to define any terms used herein." In accordance with this authorization, the
Comptroller has adopted a number of rules which appear in a pamphlet produced regu-
larly by the Retail Sales Tax Division of the Comptroller's office.
The particular rule which deals with casual and isolated sales is rule 39. In the most
recent edition of the Sales Tax Pamphlet, issued as of June 1, 1972, this rule is as follows:
CASUAL AND ISOLATED SALES
There are two elements to the exemption for casual and isolated sales: (1) the
sale must "be casual and isolated" [sic] and (2) the vendor must not be regularly
engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property. However, this exemp-
tion does not apply to any sales for an amount of $1,000 or more and also does not
apply to any sale made by or through an auctioneer or other regular dealer, whether
for an undisclosed principal or disclosed principal. A sale shall be considered to be
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for $1,000 or more if the total sales price on all sales made on the same occasion or
as part of the same transaction by the same vendor to the same purchaser aggregate
$1,000 or more, without regard to the value of the sale price of separate items.
Sales made by an officer of a court pursuant to an order of court are considered
to be casual and isolated provided that they otherwise qualify under this exemp-
tion, i.e., the sale is less than $1,000 and is not made by or through an auctioneer
or other regular dealer.
At the conclusion of the rule is the notation, "Effective July 2, 1970."
Prior to the enactment of the 1969 amendment to section 326(e), rule 39 was signifi-
cantly different from the 1971 version. The Sales Tax Pamphlet which was issued as of
July 1, 1968, contains rule 39 in the following form:
CASUAL AND ISOLATED SALES
The tax does not apply to casual and isolated sales made by a vendor who is
not engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property. However, the tax
does apply to sales made by those persons who hold themselves out as engaged in
business notwithstanding the fact that their sales may be few and infrequent.
Any property which has been used in or connected with the business of the
vendor is subject to the tax. Where a person sells his household furniture, he makes
a casual or isolated sale, since the furniture was never used in or connected with
his business.
All sales made by officers of a court, pursuant to court orders, are casual and
isolated sales, except sales made in connection with the liquidation or the conduct
of a regular established place of business. Examples of such casual sales are those
made by sheriff's in foreclosure proceedings and sale of confiscated property.
Manufacturers, processors, refiners and miners in the business of producing
and wholesalers engaged in distributing tangible personal property who sell primar-
ily other than retail, are not deemed to be making casual or isolated sales, when
they sell such tangible personalproperty to purchasers for use or consumption,
notwithstanding that sales at retail may comprise a small fraction of their total
sales.
Sales in bulk of fixtures and equipment in conjunction with the complete
liquidation of a person's business provided that by such liquidation the person, as
a legal entity, shall divest himself entirely of the business of selling tangible per-
sonal property, are considered casual and isolated sales.
Sales by contractors of their equipment are not deemed to be casual or isolated
sales and they must collect the tax thereon unless such sales take place in conjunc-
tion with a complete liquidation of the contractor's entire business.
While it probably has no legal significance, it is interesting to note that the first issue
of the Sales Tax Pamphlet following the enactment of the 1969 amendment does not
contain rule 39 in the same form as it appears in the 1971 pamphlet. The Sales Tax
Pamphlet dated June 1, 1969 contains the following version of rule 39, which falls some-
where between the two versions just set forth:
CASUAL AND ISOLATED SALES
The tax does not apply to casual and isolated sales. A sale will be deemed to
be casual and isolated and not taxable if: the sale is made by a person not regularly
engaged in the business of selling, leasing or renting tangible personal property of
any kind and the sale totals less than $1,000; or the sales are made by an officer of
a court pursuant to an order of court; or the sale is a sale in bulk of fixtures,
equipment and stock and [sic] trade in conjunction with the complete liquidation
of a business in which the seller, as a legal entity, divests himself entirely of the
business of selling tangible personal property.
A sale made by or through an auctioneer, whether for undisclosed principal or
disclosed principal, cannot qualify as a casual and isolated exempt sale.
This 1969 version of rule 39 appears to continue the casual and isolated sale exemption
for the sale of the business even though it also reflects the $1,000 limitation imposed by
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that by a fair reading of the words "engaging in business", one
cannot normally be considered to be engaging in business when
he is liquidating, unless, if while liquidating, he represents to the
public that he is still engaging in business. The court found that
in this case Maryland Engineering Company did not hold itself
out to the public as doing anything other than liquidating its
business, since it was "merely selling its stock on hand and com-
the newly enacted amendment to section 326(e). Most likely, this was merely an oversight
by the staff of the Retail Sales Tax Division responsible for production of the pamphlet,
although it might be interpreted as some evidence that the purpose of the amendment
was not to tax the sale of a business.
There are no other regulations which bear on the treatment of capital transactions.
The omission from the current version of rule 39 of any reference to the sale or liquidation
of a business does not necessarily mean that transactions of that type are taxable; how-
ever, the recent opinion has of course taken that position, and the omission of the exemp-
tion for such capital transactions from this rule certainly can be interpreted as further
evidence of the administrative position that such transactions are no longer exempt.
A recent case which involved the construction of another rule promulgated by the
Comptroller under the sales tax has re-emphasized the authority of the Comptroller to
construe the statute within reasonable limits. In F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Comp-
troller, 255 Md. 211, 257 A.2d 416 (1969), the appellant challenged Comptroller's rule 24
requiring a purchaser of electricity first to obtain an exemption certificate in order to
qualify for the statutory exclusion from sales taxation of such purchases. The Court of
Appeals held that this particular rule was an invalid attempt to render taxable purchases
which were specifically defined as not taxable, in that the rule required a resale certificate
when the statute clearly exempted such transactions per se, without any additional re-
quirements.
The opinion sets forth what, for our purposes, are the interpretive limitations which
must be faced in any challenge to a rule promulgated pursuant to section 365(a) of article
81. The opinion states, at 218-19:
[T]he construction placed upon a statute by administrative officials soon
after its enactmentment is strong, persuasive influence in determining the judicial
construction and should not be disregarded except for the strongest and most urgent
reasons ..... In Comptroller v. American Cyanamid Co., supra [240 Md. 491, 214
A.2d 596 (1965)], however, the comment is made:
'There can be no challenge to the proposition that the Comptroller cannot by
rule or otherwise make taxable that which the Legislature has excluded or ex-
empted from taxation and cannot exclude or exempt that which the law says is
taxable' Id. at 505.
This language might lend support to an argument based on rule 39 as it appeared in the
1969 edition of the Sales Tax Pamphlet, since that was the first statement issued after
the adoption of the amendment in question. As noted, however, the change in the rule
which became effective in 1970 would most likely be the interpretation by which any court
would feel bound, and it does not appear that the principal of statutory construction just
stated above would be applied against the interests of the state. Further, the rule on its
face merely reflects the clear language of the statute and is not in conflict with it. In
Thompson Trailer, however, a factual problem was presented because the partners of
Engineering, following the sale of its woodworking business, sold stock on hand, completed
a contract for cabinets and continued to operate a metal business in Randallstown for a
short period of time in order to satisfy a contractual obligation to the federal government.
The Comptroller had found that the sale to Thompson did not amount to a complete
dissolution of Engineering's business, because of the continuance of these activities.
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pleting a contract."45 This was not a sale in the ordinary course
of business, but was exempt as casual and isolated, since it was
a sale which was never to be repeated. The court then cited
Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission," a Utah case, which
held that the sale of an integrated business was a casual and
isolated sale within the meaning of the casual and isolated sales
exemption to the Utah retail sales tax. The Maryland court in
Thompson Trailer adopted the reasoning of the Utah court and
found that on the record the sale which took place in Thompson
Trailer was the kind of sale contemplated by the legislature as an
exemption to the sales tax statute. This was a definitive judicial
statement that the Maryland legislature intended the casual and
isolated sale exemption to proscribe sales taxation of the liquida-
tion of an integrated business and it seemed clear in Maryland
that the "complete liquidation, never to be repeated" test was
determinative. Thus, there would be no sales tax upon the sale
of a corporate, partnership, or proprietorship business. Unfortun-
ately, a subsequent case, Comptroller v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. ," seems to disagree sharply with the conclusion
of the Utah court in Geneva. Geneva involved the sale of an
integraed steel business by the War Assets Administration. The
State Tax Commission contended that although the sale was that
of an integrated business, the War Assets Administration was
regularly engaged in the business of selling surplus government
property and therefore the sale was not casual or isolated. The
court, however, found the sale to be casual and isolated.
In Kaiser, a similar situation was involved, where Kaiser
Aluminum purchased an aluminum extrusion plant from the
G.S.A. The sale included machinery and equipment. The
Comptroller argued that the G.S.A. was regularly engaged in the
business of selling tangible personal property. Kaiser argued that
the rule of Thompson Trailer should apply; it argued that the
G.S.A. was in the position of a liquidator who, by not holding
itself out to the public as conducting a business, was entitled to
the exemption for casual and isolated sales by a vendor not regu-
larly engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property.
The court conceded that the G.S.A. was never in the alumi-
num extrusion business or any other manufacturing business, and
it also conceded that the activities of this agency in disposing of
45. 209 Md. at 501, 121 A.2d at 856.
46. Id. at 502, 121 A.2d at 857, citing 116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949).
47. 223 Md. 384, 164 A.2d 886 (1960).
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surplus plants and equipment could not be described as doing
"business" in the absence of a profit motive. The court read the
Act, however, as requiring only the act of selling itself. The opin-
ion states:
Even in the case of sales outside the regular course of busi-
ness, we think it is clear that the tax is collectible, unless it
be shown that the particular transaction is casual and iso-
lated. In the instant case it is clear that the sale in question
is only one of a long series of operations to be continued into
the indefinite future. The appellee would have us hold that
because the sale in question was of a single, integrated plant,
the transaction was casual and isolated. We cannot conceive
that each in a series of unrelated transactions could fall in
the exempt category as being isolated and nonrecurring."
The Maryland Court of Appeals vigorously rejected the approach
of the Utah court as is evident from the following statement in
the Kaiser opinion:
The ultimate thrust of the decision in . . . [Geneva] seems
to be not upon whether the sale was casual or isolated, but
upon whether the statute purported to tax any sale of a
mixed lot of real and personal property for a lump sum. In
short, the gravamen of the decision seems to be that the
legislature could not have intended to tax complex transac-
tions, because of the difficulty of allocating a portion of the
price to the tangible personal property. We do not agree with
that reasoning.
In the instant case, we see no difficulty in making an
allocation. Indeed, the appellee made an allocation upon its
books . . . for income tax purposes."
A dissent was filed by Chief Judge Brune who argued that
the sale was casual as defined in the law since it could not pro-
perly be included in a series of sales of small articles of surplus
property. He evidently agreed with the conclusion in Geneva that
the sale of an entire plant was a unique and isolated transaction
which was not meant to be taxed by a retail sales tax statute.
Due to the Kaiser opinion, it is evident that the Court of
Appeals has decided to apply the sales tax to the sale of an entire
business operation, at least to the extent that it includes the
transfer of tangible personal property. This decision was reached
48. Id. at 389, 164 A.2d at 888-89.
49. Id. at 390, 164 A.2d at 889.
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when the statutory exemption for casual sales was considerably
broader than it now is. It can therefore be argued that the court
would have no hesitancy to continue to apply the sales tax to such
capital transactions. There would be no need for an inquiry as to
whether the sale was one of a series, so long as the tangible per-
sonal property so transferred had a value of $1,000 or more. As
noted above, the opinion in Kaiser appears to reject the conclu-
sion reached in the Thompson Trailer case as to the intent of the
legislature with regard to the imposition of sales tax on the capi-
tal transaction of a sale of a business. Surely, therefore, if the
court believed the legislature could have meant to tax capital
transactions under the Act as it existed prior to the 1969 amend-
ment, they would not likely find, subsequent to that amendment,
that the legislature no longer intended to tax such events.
In 1970 the decision of A CF Industries, Inc. v. Comptroller'
effectively reaffirmed the holding in Kaiser. In this case the ap-
pellant was a diversified corporation engaged in manufacturing,
electronics, research and other business activities. At some time
prior to 1966, it had acquired an electronics laboratory in Prince
George's County. This business was sold in 1966 to ITT in ex-
change for 21,000 shares of ITT stock; the laboratory was not
separately incorporated. ACF was also the operator of a research
company in Riverdale. This was run as another division of the
business for approximately nine years, and it was sold to another
purchaser in 1966 or 1967. A total sales tax of $15,000 was assessed
with respect to the sale of the personal property involved in each
of the sales of these businesses. ACF appealed to the Maryland
Tax Court which affirmed liability for a sales tax on both transac-
tions. In its opinion, the Tax Court found that in the preceding
thirteen years, ACF had acquired and sold or otherwise disposed
of five separate business activities, including these two. It also
found that ACF had sold and was still selling tangible personal
property in Maryland in the regular course of its business, partic-
ularly used and obsolete equipment and machinery, and that it
had retained one other business activity aside from the five of
which it had disposed. Emphasis was placed on the fact that
neither of the two businesses sold subject to the sales tax had
been separately incorporated. The Circuit Court of Prince
George's County affirmed the decision of the Tax Court, and this
decision was in turn affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
50. 257 Md. 513, 263 A.2d 574 (1970).
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The appellant relied on the casual and isolated sale exemp-
tion as defined by the rule of Thompson Trailer and Comptrol-
ler's rule 39. It argued that the sales were not part of a planned
series of transactions and were in fact casual and isolated, and
that the exemption properly applied to sales of separate and ide-
pendent businesses of a taxpayer who remains in business after
the sales. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It found
that for a sale to be exempt as casual and isolated, it had to be
made by a vendor not regularly engaged in the business of selling
tangible personal property, as well as being casual and isolated.
Since it was conceded that ACF was still selling tangible personal
property in Maryland in the regular course of its business, an
essential requisite for qualification as an exempt vendor under
the casual sale exemption was lacking. The court distinguished
Thompson Trailer, on the basis of the fact that the vendors in
that case were selling their entire business and plant to retire
from business. There had been no repeated pattern of sales of
separate business activities along with sales of other tangible per-
sonal property on a regular basis, such as had been demonstrated
by ACF.
Maryland Glass Corp. v. Comptroller,"' a 1958 case, also in-
terpreted the rule of Thompson Trailer, applying a futher limita-
tion to its "complete liquidation, never to be repeated" test. Be-
tween 1949 and 1954 Maryland Glass had purchased a number of
pieces of machinery for manufacturing glassware from a Connect-
icut supplier. The Comptroller assessed use taxes of approxi-
mately $12,000 on these purchases, and after payment under pro-
test a claim for refund was filed with the Baltimore City Court.52
The claim was denied, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that the property in question was not readily obtainable
in Maryland, an exemption under the use tax statute in force at
that time.53
51. 217 Md. 241, 142 A.2d 570 (1958).
52. The use tax is a tax imposed by MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 373 (1969). The use
tax only applies to those transactions which would be subject to a sales tax but for the
fact that the sale did not take place in Maryland. Therefore, any transaction which would
be exempt from the sales tax is also exempt from the use tax. Comptroller v. American
Cyanamid Co., 240 Md. 491, 214 A.2d 596 (1965); Comptroller v. Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp., 227 Md. 252, 176 A.2d 210 (1961); Comptroller v. Glenn R. Martin Co.,
216 Md. 235, 140 A.2d 288 (1958).
53. The exemption in question exempted from taxation "[tlangible personal prop-
erty not readily obtainable in Maryland . . . used . . . in this State by a person engaged
in . . . manufacturing . . . if such tangible personal property enters into the processing
of . . . the product . . . which is manufactured . Ch. 681, § 310(f) [1947] Md.
Laws 1673 (repealed 1955).
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court on another
issue raised by Maryland Glass, that of whether or not the sale
was casual or isolated and thereby exempt from the use tax. 4 The
lower court held that the sales in question were not casual or
isolated. In this case, the seller had been required to offer the
equipment for sale by virtue of an order in an antitrust case
against it. The seller had previously leased the machinery to
Maryland Glass and had also licensed its use under a number of
patents. Pursuant to the antitrust order, the property was trans-
ferred at its book value in the hands of the seller, in exchange for
a price determined by a formula contained in the antitrust order
reflecting prior lease and royalty payments. The court's rationale
for denying the exemption and affirming the lower court was that
Maryland Glass not only acquired title to the equipment, but also
a "bundle of rights" making up complete title to the machinery
without any requirement for the payment of subsequent royalties
or patent fees. In this sense, the purchase of the equipment was
somewhat akin to the purchase of equipment in a business ac-
quisition, since Maryland Glass acquired more than just the nuts
and bolts of the machinery. The corporation thus attempted to
argue the rule of Thompson Trailer on a theory that the equip-
ment sales here were in effect pursuant to a liquidation of the
previous leasing business of the seller. The case is significant
because the Court of Appeals once again reiterated that
Thompson Trailer dealt with the complete liquidation of the only
business of the seller, which was never to be repeated. The opin-
ion also emphasized that there was no separate sale of the patent
rights to the machinery, and that the transactions fell within the
definition of "price" in the statute.5 There seems to be an impli-
cation that a separate sale of the patent rights would not have
been subject to the use tax, but the facts did not support such
separate treatment.
Subject to the difficulty of reconciling Thompson Trailer
with Kaiser as to legislative intent, it was presumably the inten-
tion of the legislature at least prior to the enactment of the 1969
amendment to exempt from tax the sale of personal property
transferred as a component part of the sale of an integrated busi-
54. As noted earlier, all exemptions which apply to the sales tax are also applicable
to the use tax. This is specifically provided at the present time in MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 375(b) (1969) which in enumerating specific exemptions states: "(b) When exempt from
retail sales tax. -Tangible personal property expressly exempted from the retail sales tax
imposed by this State under the terms and provisions of § 326 of this article."
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 324(i) (1969).
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ness. That may still be the intent of the legislature, to the extent
that they were not conscious of the effect of the 1969 amendment.
That amendment's language is, however, so clear that it renders
pointless any attempt to look at the intent behind it. It could also
be argued that the passage of that amendment is an indication
of a different intent on the part of the legislature.
Summarizing the effect of these four cases on sales taxation
of capital transactions, it is clear that the courts of Maryland
have not been hesitant to apply the tax to the sale of businesses.
Prior to the 1969 amendment, it was reasonably clear that the
sale of a business in the course of which the seller completely
terminated its business activities was not subject to the tax by
virtue of the casual and isolated sale exemption. On the other
hand, if the seller sold a series of businesses, it was subject to the
tax with respect to the tangible personal property transferred in
each sale. As to other capital transactions-mergers, reorganiza-
tions, corporate and partnership formations-there is no state-
ment of past or present judicial policy, and presumably, this is
still an open question. It must be recognized, however, that the
few cases discussed here clearly indicate a propensity on the part
of the Comptroller and the courts to tax these events.
THE 1972 OPINION
With the background of the Act itself and the judicial inter-
pretations reviewed above, we should briefly consider the opinion
of the Attorney General of Maryland" which, in effect, an-
nounced the intentions of the Retail Sales Tax Division to impose
the sales tax on capital transactions.
After a brief review of certain definitional sections of the Act,
the opinion states:
The general rule of these sections is that all transfers of
title or possession, or both, of tangible personal property not
otherwise exempted or excluded, made for a consideration,
are subject to the tax. That the imposition of the tax is not
normally dependent upon the nature of the Seller's business
or whether the sale is made in the regular course of business
is well established. 57
The opinion then examines the statutory exemption for casual
and isolated sales prior to the enactment of the 1969 amendment,
56. The Daily Record (Baltimore), Apr. 8, 1972, at 4, col. 2.
57. Id.
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particularly as it had been construed in the Thompson Trailer,
ACF, and Kaiser cases. The opinion concludes as to the prior
practice:
It is our opinion that these cases establish that a sale of
an entire business cannot be considered exempt as casual
and isolated where either the vendor continues to remain
regularly engaged in any other business activities in which
he sells tangible personal property, or where the sale is one
of several in a series of similar transactions or is otherwise a
planned or expectable part of the vendor's operations 5
The opinion then discusses the 1969 amendment and its in-
terpretation in an earlier opinion. 9 It notes that this amendment
has the effect of making the exemption inapplicable as to sales
in conjunction with the liquidation of a business for an amount
of $1,000 or more, and that in determining whether the $1,000
limit had been met in the sale of an entire business only the
amount paid for the tangible personal property is to be consid-
ered.60
Having disposed of the casual and isolated sale exemption,
the author examines at some length the general statutory scheme
of the Act. He notes that the Act contains no exclusion for sales
of an entire business apart from the casual sale exemption, and
if that exemption does not apply, the general provisions of the Act
are applicable to determine if any part of the transaction is sub-
ject to the retail sales tax .6
The opinion does, at least, recognize that a number of ele-
ments involved in the sale of an entire business would not be
taxable under the statute. These include: intangible property
such as good will or receivables; real property or other assets not
classifiable as tangible personal property; property which is ex-
cluded from taxation by virtue of the definition of "retail sale"
in the Act, such as stock in trade held for resale, raw materials
to be used as a material or part of other tangible personal prop-
erty to be produced for sale by manufacturing, or fuel consumed
in manufacturing or processing; and any property or transaction
within the terms of any of the remaining statutory exemptions,
58. Id. at col. 2-3.
59. 55 Op. MD. Arr'y GEN. 384 (1970).
60. Id.
61. In a footnote, there is a citation to the conclusion in Kaiser, which rejected the
holding of Geneva Steel, that the legislative intent was not to tax capital transactions, at
least with regard to the sale of a business.
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such as sales of motor vehicles upon which the titling tax has been
levied. The requirements that property be transferred for a con-
sideration and that the tax be computed on the basis of the price
of the retail sale are briefly dealt with, essentially leaving it to the
administrative authorities to determine the existence of consider-
ation and the amount of the price.
At this point the opinion finally comes to the heart of the
question at hand-the sales taxation of capital transactions. It
states:
The general rule of the sales tax is that it is applicable
to all sales of tangible personal property made in this State
other than those specifically exempted or excluded. We find
nothing which would alter this rule in the case of transfers
of an entire business, bulk sales, or other transactions out of
the ordinary course of business, other than the exemption for
casual and isolated sales, which is extremely limited in its
application, and which must be strictly construed against
the taxpayers.2
The opinion then applies this conclusion to three examples of
capital transactions.
The first example considered is that of the liquidation of a
subsidiary corporation by merger into its parent corporation. The
opinion finds that such a transaction would not be subject to
imposition of the sales tax, since it is not made for a considera-
tion, or if there is a consideration, it is valueless. The conclusion
rests on the fact that the transfer of the corporate property is
made by operation of law pursuant to Maryland corporate law,
and that following such transfer by operation of law, the stock of
the subsidiary previously held by the parent is without any value.
There is no physical transfer of the stock certificates, and no other
consideration is paid to the transferee of the property. This is
consistent with the approach taken in earlier opinions reviewed
below concerning liquidating dividends and distributions in
liquidation to shareholders of a dissolving corporation.
Having reached this conclusion, however, the opinion makes
what could be a financially disastrous leap for Maryland taxpay-
ers involved in capital transactions. It states:
However, as to other transfers under Article 23, [the
Maryland corporate law] made pursuant to Articles of con-
solidation . . ., Articles of merger . . .or Articles of sale,
62. The Daily Record (Baltimore), Apr. 8, 1972, at 4, col. 3 (footnote omitted).
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lease, exchange or transfer. . . a transfer of assets could and
in all probability would be made in return for an ascertain-
able consideration, either in money, stock or some other
form. In such transactions, we believe that the sales tax
would normally be applicable and must be calculated on the
basis of the actual consideration given in return for the trans-
fer of the property in question. 3
The second example concerns the creation of a new corpora-
tion by an existing Maryland corporation. The existing corpora-
tion will transfer all of the operating assets of its business to the
new corporation and receive in return all of its capital stock. The
old corporation will continue in existence as a holding company
of which the new corporation will be a wholly-owned subsidiary.
The opinion finds that this is not a transfer such as the previously
described merger in liquidation, in that it is not made pursuant
to any provision under the Maryland corporate law which accom-
plishes a transfer of title by operation of law. The stock which is
transferred to the parent corporation in exchange for the assets
must, according to the opinion, be viewed as "property" which
can constitute "consideration" for purposes of the Act. In sup-
port, the opinion cites the decision in ACF and earlier opinions
of the Attorney General with respect to transfers of real estate and
motor vehicles to newly formed corporations, where such trans-
fers were held to be subject to taxation under the recordation tax,
and the motor vehicle titling tax, respectively. The opinion con-
cludes:
Since there appears to be no question that the transfer
of assets to an existing corporation in return for shares of its
stock is a taxable transaction under the Retail Sales Tax Act
if the casual and isolated sales exemption is inapplicable, as
in the ACF case, because the vendor continues to remain
engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property,
or as discussed above, because the sale is for an amount of
$1,000.00 or more, we can find no basis for distinguishing the
instant transaction, merely because the purchaser is a
newly-formed corporation, rather than an existing corpora-
tion. In either case, there is a transfer of title and possession
of tangible personal property, between separate legal enti-
ties, made for consideration. Having found that all of the
elements necessary to constitute a 'sale' are present and,
63. Id. at col. 4.
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assuming, that some part of the property transferred is not
purchased for resale (e.g., the manufacturing equipment,
office supplies, etc.), it is our opinion that the transaction
would be a 'retail sale' subject to the tax. 4
As a final comment on this second example, the author some-
what facetiously notes that if the value of the property transferred
is less than $1,000, the transaction may still be exempt within the
very limited casual sale provision now in the Act. 5
The third and final example appearing in the opinion con-
cerns the incorporation of a sole proprietorship or a partnership,
upon which all of the assets of the former business are transferred
to a new corporation in return for its stock. It again concludes
that all of the elements of a "sale" under the Act are met, namely,
a transfer of title and possession of tangible personal property
between separate entities made for a consideration. The opinion
again refers to the previous opinions on the application of recor-
dation and title tax to the transfer of property on the incorpora-
tion of a new entity. While the author concedes that the legisla-
ture may not have intended to subject this type of transaction to
the retail sales tax, he finds no exclusion or exemption which can
be applied to exempt such an incorporation.
Attention is quite properly directed to a recent amendment
to the Maryland motor vehicle law which provided in very spe-
cific terms an exemption for incorporation in very specific terms
from the excise tax on motor vehicles." Since this taxing statute
is essentially identical in format to the sales tax statute, the
analogy is very tellingly made in the opinion. Thus, the opinion
64. Id. at col. 5. On the question of the amount of the "price" paid, the opinion
suggests reference to the market price of the corporate stock transferred in exchange for
the property, as of the day of the transaction in question. Recognizing that in its own
example no readily ascertainable market value can be determined, the opinion concludes
in this situation that the value of the stock and the amount of the price paid "must be
considered to be presumptively equal to the fair market value of the property transferred."
Id.
65. This miniscule benefit is immediately diminished by subsequent language which
states that even if the sale involved such a small amount of property, it may still fail the
test of Thompson Trailer, if it is part of a continuing series of transactions and if the seller
remains in business following the sale.
66. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 3-831(a) (Supp. 1972). This section imposes an
excise tax on the issuance of original and subsequent certificates of title for motor vehicles
in Maryland. The amendment added an exception to the imposition of this tax, which
reads as follows: ". . . motor vehicles transferred from an individual to a partnership or
corporation upon formation of the partnership or corporation, when the individual is a
partner in the newly formed partnership or a principal stockholder in the newly formed
corporation .. " Id.
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concludes that incorporation transactions are taxable retail sales,
subject to sales tax unless the very limited casual sale exemption
applies.
A principal source of interpretative material on which the
March 10, 1972 opinion relies consists of earlier opinions of the
Attorney General determining the applicability of various Mary-
land taxes to capital transactions. The majority of these opinions
deal with the recordation tax; however, there are two relevant
opinions in other areas, one of which concerns the titling tax
imposed on the transfer of motor vehicles and the other an inter-
pretation of the 1969 amendment to the casual sale exemption
under the sales tax. None of these opinions, with the sole excep-
tion of the one relating to the sales tax, have any direct persuasive
authority; however, they present evidence of administrative and
legislative treatment of capital transactions in related areas
which arguably requires similar treatment under the sales tax.67
The opinions which deal with the recordation tax have drawn
distinctions between taxable and non-taxable transactions on the
basis of the vesting of title. If the determination is made that the
transaction in question merely vests record title in the holder of
equitable title, no tax will be due. For example, no tax was paya-
ble when the sole shareholder of a dissolved corporation received
a deed conveying all of its real estate. 8 Similarly, no tax was due
when a subsidiary transferred all of its assets to its parent as a
liquidating dividend, 9 nor when two corporations merged and one
67. This is a most difficult argument to make in view of the comprehensive and
relatively self-contained nature of the Act, and its total lack of interrelationship with the
recordation or motor vehicle titling taxes.
68. 24 Op. MD. Arr'Y GEN. 973 (1939). This opinion stated that "[t]he stockholder,
although without legal title, has a very definite interest in the corporate property and upon
dissolution and payment of the corporate debts the stockholder becomes vested with an
equitable title to the real estate. The deed to him is only for the purpose of vesting in him
the legal title to what is, in substance, already his property." Id. It concludes that there
was no "consideration paid or to be paid" by the stockholder with respect to the property
which was transferred to him, and therefore, no recordation tax is payable.
69. 22 Op. MD. A"r'y GEN. 808 (1937). This opinion seemed to assume that no tax
was payable upon the transfer by a subsidiary corporation of all of its assets to its parent
as a liquidating dividend. This was clarified by then Deputy Attorney General Hall Ham-
mond in a later opinion, 32 Op. MD. ATT'y GEN. 394 (1947), which considered the applica-
tion of the recordation tax to a deed conveying real estate from a subsidiary to a parent
in connection with the dissolution of the subsidiary and the distribution of all of its assets
to the parent. In this opinion, it was held that if the execution of the deed was one of a
series of steps in a bona fide and final dissolution, no recordation tax was payable, on the
same theory that the deed merely vests record title in the holder of equitable title. The
opinion goes on to state, however, that the tax would be due if there was only "an
indefinite intention of dissolving" the subsidiary. He also indicates that the clerk to whom
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executed a deed conveying real estate to the other. 0 On the other
hand, if the transaction is viewed as one which passes more than
mere legal title, the sales tax will be found applicable. For exam-
ple, the assessment of tax was made where real estate was trans-
ferred to a corporation in exchange for stock," and where personal
property was transferred by a corporation under a second mort-
gage, although the property had already been transferred to the
same mortgagor by a first mortgage from a related corporation. 2
the opinion is directed should be satisfied that no consideration passed between the
parties, implying that the distribution of property with respect to the stock held by the
parent did not constitute consideration for purposes of the recordation tax.
70. 43 Op. MD. Arr'y GEN. 332 (1958). Here two corporations merged, one of them
executing a deed conveying real estate to the surviving corporation. The opinion cites the
appropriate section of the Maryland corporate law which provides that, upon a consolida-
tion or merger in accordance with that law, all of the property of the corporations party
to the merger vests in the surviving corporation. The opinion then concludes that in the
case of a corporate merger, a change in title takes effect automatically upon compliance
with the merger provisions of the corporate law. The deed to the surviving corporation only
transfers legal title to what is already its property, and therefore, no recordation tax is
payable. Cited as supporting authority are a number of opinions which state that no tax
is payable where there is no actual consideration paid or to be paid. While it is not clear
what the author of the opinion understood to be the payment of any consideration upon
the merger in question, it is hard to believe that he knowingly took the position that no
consideration is paid in a corporate merger.
A later opinion, 47 Op. MD. ATr'Y GEN. 196 (1962), reaffirms this treatment of the
recordation of an instrument merely confirming a transfer of real property effected
through the statutory provisions of the Maryland corporate law. This opinion concerns the
transfer of all of the property and assets of Bowie Race Track by Articles of Sale. While a
very substantial consideration was paid, the opinion makes it clear that the deed in
question was merely confirmatory and did not "convey title" to the transferee, which is
the basis for application of the recordation tax.
71. 32 OP. MD. ATr'y GEN. 394 (1947). In this case, two individuals conveyed their
fee simple interest in real estate to a Maryland corporation which they apparently formed,
in exchange for stock of the corporation. The "net cost" to the individuals of the real estate
was somehow fixed, and they received corporate stock in an amount equal in value to that
figure in exchange for the property. The opinion states:
It is a well established principle that a corporation is a distinct legal entity,
separate and apart from its stockholders. Thus, where a corporation takes fee sim-
ple title to real estate under a general warranty deed, it holds the property in its
own name and right and not in trust for the stockholders. This would be true in
ordinary circumstances even though there were only a single stockholder. Moreover,
where the corporation pays for the real estate by issuing shares of its stock, the
transferor has received actual and valuable consideration for his grant.
Id. at 395. It concludes that the transaction is properly taxable, but that the proper
measure of consideration is the current value of the transferred property, not necessarily
the "net cost" to the individuals.
The 1939 opinion was distinguished on the basis that facts in this case involved more
than the mere vesting of technical legal title in the persons already holding equitable title.
It appears to be questionable whether this is a valid distinction, for in each instance, the
shareholders are merely exchanging one type of interest for another, and in both instances
the legal title to the property in question is transferred. Therefore, if the tax is applicable
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There are no other opinions concerning the recordation tax;
however, in another Attorney General's opinion, the motor vehi-
cle titling tax was held applicable to the transfer of title to certain
property from a partnership to a newly formed corporation in
exchange for stock.73
to transfers upon formation of a corporation, it should be equally applicable to transfers
in dissolution of that corporation. See also 42 Op. MD. Arr'y GEN. 372 (1957), where the
seller had transferred real property to a corporation in exchange for shares of its capital
stock, and as part of the transaction the corporation assumed a mortgage on the property.
The value of the stock was equal to the value of the real estate, less the amount of the
assumed mortgage. The opinion found that the recordation tax should be calculated on
the value of the stock plus the amount of the mortgage assumed, thus implicitly consider-
ing the corporate stock to be consideration paid for purposes of the recordation tax. Once
again, it is somewhat difficult to integrate this interpretation of the status of corporate
stock with the treatment given to that stock upon its cancellation and liquidation in the
opinions dealing with dissolutions.
72, 49 Op. MD. ATT'y GEN. 461 (1964), which involved a Maryland corporation which
executed a chattel mortgage as security for a substantial loan. Thereafter, another corpo-
ration, the stock of which was owned by substantially the same persons owning the stock
of the first corporaticn, exe, uted a chattel mortgage to the same mortgagee with respect
to the same persrhal property. The second mortgagee claimed an exemption from any
recordation tax oi. the recording of the new chattel mortgage, but the ruling denied the
exemption. The opinion states: "[W]e can only view the extrinsic identification of the
property mortgaged, the amount of debt secured and the stockholders of the two debtor
corporations as neutral circumstances. Regardless what kind of corporate reorganization
underlay the rearrangement to which the stated facts bear witness, it is apparent that
whatever is sought to be accomplished under the new mortgage [is not affected by the
original mortgage]." Id. at 462.
73. 32 Op. MD. Arr'y GEN. 285 (1947). The question here was whether the transfer
of title of various buses to a newly formed charter and school bus corporation by members
of the partnership which formerly conducted the business constituted a sale within the
meaning of the section of the motor vehicle law imposing a titling tax upon the transfer
of title to motor vehicles. The partners in question had transferred all of the property of
the partnership to the corporation in exchange for an equal number of shares of stock.
The opinion considers the definition of "sale" in various cases, treatises, the Uniform
Sales Act and also in its general statutory use. It then reached the following conclusion:
Revenue statutes are to receive a reasonable construction with a view to carry-
ing out their purposes and intent, . . . and we think the net result of the authorities
which we have cited is that the transaction about which you inquire is a sale within
the meaning and intent. . . [of the statute in question], and that upon the issu-
ance of titles for the motor vehicles the 2% excise tax based upon their fair market
value must be collected. It cannot be said that the transfer of the motor vehicles
was not a sale within the meaning of that term, .... The issuance of capital stock
to the individuals comprising the partnership certainly furnished the valuable con-
sideration for the transfer and if the term 'sales or resales' as used in the Act was
to be understood and applied as meaning something which altered the Lockerman
case, the General Assembly, we must presume, would have furnished us with its
own definition.
We are unable to conclude that the Legislature, without furnishing some other
statutory standard by which a sale was to be defined, intended to repudiate the
definition adopted by the Court of Appeals.
Id., at 288. The case referred to is Eastern Shore Trust Co. v. Lockerman, 148 Md. 628,
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The opinion concerning the casual sale exemption under the
amended section 326(e)7" relates to sales by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy which exceed $1,000 or which are made by an auctioneer,
and states:
. . . It is our opinion that the 1969 amendment removes
any exemption which section 326 previously provided for
sales made by a trustee in bankruptcy in conjunction with
the liquidation of a bankrupt's estate where the sale is for an
amount of $1,000 or more, or is made through an auctioneer.
Under this provision as it existed before the 1969
amendment sales made by a trustee in bankruptcy in con-
junction with a liquidation would have been considered ex-
empt if they fell within the doctrine first enunciated in
[Thompson Trailer] and further developed in [Kaiser and
ACE], ....
The 1969 amendment substantially changes the pre-
existing law relating to casual and isolated sales. We have no
difficulty in determining the clear mandate of the amend-
ment to mean that any sale which is for an amount of $1,000
or more .... 75
This opinion has had a direct influence on the interpretation
of the applicability of the sales tax to capital transactions. The
conclusion which was reached clearly presages the 1972 opinion
in its assertion that the 1969 amendment substantially changed
the law and was intended to limit the casual sale exemption only
to sales of less than $1,000. Nevertheless, the recordation tax
opinions dealing with liquidation distributions should be persu-
asive in the sales tax area, for if no consideration is deemed to
have been paid for the purposes of one tax, it is seemingly inequit-
able to assert its existence for purposes of another tax. It is hard
to imagine a dissolution situation involving merely corporate
stock in which consideration was "paid" for tangible personal
property but not for real property. In a contrary fashion, however,
the recordation tax opinions dealing with corporate formation
129 A. 915 (1925), where it was held that, "[t]o sell means ordinarily to transfer to
another for a valuable consideration the title or the right to possess property." Id. at 636,
129 A. at 919.
74. 55 Op. MD. ATr'Y GEN. 384 (1970).
75. Id. at 384-86.
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lend further support to the conclusion that the sales tax is applic-
able to certain capital transactions."
SOME INTERIM ARGUMENTS AND ALTERNATIVES
It is apparent that the present Maryland law as judicially
and administratively interpreted does not provide much encour-
agement to the attorney or businessman confronted with a poten-
tially taxable capital transaction. To the extent that title or pos-
session to any tangible personal property is transferred for some
form of consideration from one legal entity to another, such
transactions will be held subject to the sales tax. The presump-
tion raised by section 333 of the Act, that all sales of tangible
personal property are subject to tax until the contrary is estab-
lished, is a looming obstacle to an argument for exemption, now
that there is no statutory dxemption where more than $1,000 is
involved.7 The general scheme of the Act supports taxability and
the general direction of sales taxation seems to be towards the
imposition of a tax on any transfer to a final consumer. Transfers
of tangible personal property in capital transactions fall within
this last category, and from an economic point of view; there is
little reason or logic for an exemption. An application of the tax
would make the application of the sales tax more "neutral," pre-
sumably a desirable goal for all taxing statutes.
The most compelling reason for this conclusion is the explic-
itness of the 1969 amendment to the casual sale exemption. Al-
though it is highly probable that the legislature did not intend to
extend the Act to capital transactions, the law as enacted clearly
removes the only exemption in the Act which might have ex-
76. One other opinion should be noted, although its holding is somewhat confusing.
In 39 Op. MD. A'rr'Y GEN. 219 (1954), liability for the motor vehicle excise tax was consid-
ered with respect to buses transferred in a statutory merger. The opinion states that the
tax would not be due, in apparent reliance on the provision of Maryland corporate law
transferring title to such assets upon a merger by operation of law. The tax is not imposed,
though, on transfers, but rather on the issuance of certificates of title. MD. ANN. CODE art.
661/2 § 3-831(a) (1969). Whether the transfer is by operation of law or otherwise, the tax
on its face would seem to be payable any time a certificate is issued. One could view the
issuance of the certificate as mere confirmation of the already vested title (like a confirma-
tory deed in the recordation opinions) and presumably reach the result of this opinion.
That ignores, however, the different acts which trigger the imposition of these two
taxes-recordation of documents conveying title, in the one case, and issuance of a certifi-
cate of title in the other.
77. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 333 (1969) provides in pertinent part that "[i]t shall
be presumed that all sales of tangible personal property . . . are subject to tax until the
contrary is established, and the burden of proving that a sale is not taxable hereunder
shall be upon the vendor or the purchaser as the case may be."
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cluded such transactions from taxation. As previously discussed,
prior to the 1969 amendment the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated that there was no legislative intent to exclude capital
transactions per se from the sales tax; therefore, there is little
hope for the creation of a judicial exemption."s In addition, any
argument as to intent would run head on into the explicit lan-
guage of the statute, since it is a long standing rule of statutory
construction that where the words are clear there will be no inves-
tigation into legislative intent.
In spite of the clear statutory language, attorneys will never-
theless be expected to develop arguments against imposition of
the sales tax and to suggest alternative methods for structuring
transactions so that the tax will not be due.
Returning to our hypothetical clients, A and B, let us con-
sider what advice can be given. Where A and B have proposed to
form a partnership,which is later to be incorporated, a strong
argument can be made that there is no true "purchaser" within
the definition of the Act. This would also be applicable to liquida-
tions and dissolutions, for all four cases involve transactions in
which no actual consideration in money or its equivalent is paid
by a third party. There is no Maryland case in which a general
definition of "purchaser" or a "purchase" is given. There are a
number of cases, however, which seem to imply that a purchase
takes place when there is a voluntary agreement whereby prop-
erty passes hands for an actual consideration in money or its
equivalent, as distinguished from an acquisition by operation of
law. 9 Taking this approach, there is no purchaser in any capital
transaction where there is no actual consideration paid. Since the
78. An example of the creation of a casual sale exemption formed through judicial
action is found in Georgia's treatment of the sales tax. The Georgia statute, GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 92-3402a-03a (1972) has no provision for an exemption for casual sales. The statute
taxes every person engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property, and
broadly defines "business" in the same manner as the Maryland statute. In Novah v.
Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755, 81 S.E. 2d 222 (Ct. App. 1954), the Georgia court determined
that the legislature had no intention to tax a casual or isolated sale since the definition of
the term "business" implied a continuity of transactions and not a single transaction. The
court then concluded that a bulk sale was exempt as a casual or isolated transaction by a
person not in business. See also Williams v. Sunannee Longleaf Mfg. Co., 97 Ga. App.
431, 103 S.E. 2d 123 (Ct. App. 1958); State v. Dyson, 89 Ga. App. 791, 81 S.E. 2d 217
(Ct. App. 1954). As a result of these court decisions, the state tax authorities adopted an
administrative regulation providing for the casual sale exemption. GA. TAX. REGS. § 560-
12-1-.07.
79. See, e.g., Bowles v. Nelson-Ricks Creamery Co., 66 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Idaho
1946); City of Enterprise v. Smith, 62 Kan. 815, 62 P. 324 (1900); Cobb v. Webb, 26 Tex.
Civ. App. 467, 64 S.W. 792 (Civ. App. 1901).
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tax is imposed on a vendor who is to collect it from "the pur-
chaser," there can be no tax if there is no purchaser. This position
is strengthened theoretically by the fact that in each case neither
economic substance nor equitable ownership has changed.
A variation on this theme, and a particularly persuasive
point in business formations, is the argument that there is no
"sale" in these types of capital transactions. This is, perhaps, a
somewhat more difficult position to maintain, since the definition
of a sales' encompasses any transaction whereby title or posses-
sion, or both, of tangible personal property is or is to be trans-
ferred by any means whatsoever. With such a definition, it would
appear that virtually every transaction in which any property is
in fact transferred would be covered. Encouragement can be
found, however, in the treatment of rental and leased property
under the Act. The "title or possession" language included in the
definition of "sale" has been in the Act since its adoption in 1947,
but prior to June 1, 1955, the Retail Sales Tax Division acknowl-
edged that the sales tax did not apply to rentals or leases of
tangible personal property.8 l By an amendment to the Act effec-
tive on that date,8 2 the words "including rental, lease or license
to use, or royalty" were added to the "sale" definition in section
324(d). Thereafter, the tax was accordingly assessed.
The analogy to our concern lies in a lease or rental arrange-
ment's facial satisfaction of the original definition of "sale."
Clearly, possession of tangible personal property is transferred for
a consideration in such a case. Title remains in the vendor, but
transfer of title has never been required by section 324(d). 3 It
would seem that the Comptroller did not assess the tax in the
belief that, absent statutory explication, a rental or lease did not
comport with the general understanding of a sale and the intent
of the Act, even though it would have been covered by a literal
reading of the law. Similarly, capital transactions which do not
involve a change in economic or equitable substance should not
80. The term "sale" as defined in article 81 includes any "transaction whereby title
or possession, or both, of tangible personal property is or is to be transferred by any means
whatsoever .. " MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 324 (d) (1968).
81. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, TAx LAWS AND REGULATIONS, Maryland Retail
Sales and Use Tax Acts with Rules and Regulations, rule 73, at 65,013, which states: "the
tax must be collected and/or paid on all rentals for periods after May 31, 1955.
82. Ch. 332, §§ 1-5, [1955] Md. Laws 504-08.
83. For a discussion of this point see Comptroller v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel
Co., 231 Md. 132, 145-47, 189 A.2d 107, 114-15 (1963).
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fall within the usual context of taxable retail sales and should not
be taxable without further statutory amendment.84
A valid planning device derived from the foregoing analysis
can be used in partnership formations or incorporations which
might involve taxable transfers of substantial amounts of tangi-
ble personal property such as equipment and machinery. For ex-
ample, the A-B partnership would receive 1,000 shares of com-
mon stock of Flower, Inc. upon payment of $1,000. That transac-
tion would obviously not be covered by the sales tax. The balance
of the business assets of the partnership would then be trans-
ferred to the new corporation, but no additional consideration
(shares of stock) would be issued. Thus, the sales tax, while appl-
icable, would be zero since it is measured by the "price" paid by
the purchaser. In this instance, the purchasing corporation has
paid nothing, but has merely received a contribution to capital
from its stockholders. Putting this into a partnership context, the
documentation should substantiate that the partnership interest
is acquired for a nominal price, followed by a contribution to the
partnership by the partners without payment of additional con-
sideration in the form of increased partnership interests. The
same technique should be employed in any expansion of the part-
nership involving acquisition of taxable property, since this
would legally constitute the termination of the previous entity
and the formation of a new partnership.
Several other forms of capital transactions continue to be
exempt from the sales tax, and the most advisable course of ac-
tion would be to follow their formats to the extent possible. One,
such example is the liquidation of a subsidiary into its parent
corporation, pursuant to Maryland corporate law."8 Another situ-
ation is a tax-free reorganization involving the exchange of corpo-
84. Where a corporate liquidation is involved, another argument can be based on
the recordation tax opinion holding that the distributee in liquidation is merely receiving
legal title to property already owned equitably. 30 Op. MD. ATr'y GEN. 193 (1945). Reli-
ance on the treatment of transactions under other taxing statutes is questionable, because
of the self-contained nature of the Act and its relative lack of interrelationship with other
taxes. These problems arise again in any attempt to argue unconstitutional discrimination
in the application of the sales tax to transactions to which the recordation tax or motor
vehicle titling tax are not applied. Such an argument might be made, for example, with
respect to mergers under Maryland corporate law. The different schemes of the taxing
statutes, however, seriously weaken the argument. Certainly, if the legislature wishes to
apply one type of tax to a transaction which is exempted from another type of tax, that is
its prerogative.
85. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 325, 324 (i) (1969).
86. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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rate stock under section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 7 or any other transaction which simply involved the trans-
fer of shares of stock as opposed to the transfer of the underlying
corporate assets. A triangular reorganization under section
368(a)(2)(E) of the Internal Revenue Code8 also falls within this
area. In this situation the surviving corporation would be the
acquired corporation which originally owned the tangible per-
sonal property in question and the only transfer is that of the
stock of the acquired corporation. For example, suppose that
General Gardens Corporation formed Greater Flower, Inc., which
then merged into Flower, Inc., whereupon A and B received Gen-
eral Gardens stock for the stock of their company. Flower, Inc.
would thereafter be a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Gar-
dens, and title to its property would not have changed. Even
though this accomplishes through one form without the imposi-
tion of sales tax a transfer which might be subject to that tax in
another form, a "substance over form" argument should not
pierce the legal framework within which the transaction rests.8
Under the terms of the Act itself, there is no way that this trans-
action can be construed to have transferred title or possession of
any tangible personal property. It is clear from the 1972 opinion
that form is a dominant consideration, and in this instance, form
can be turned around on the taxing authorities to prevent the
imposition of the sales tax.
87. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1)(B) defines one type of reorganization which
is exempt from taxation under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 354. The definition applies to
the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock
(or in exchange solely for all or part of the voting stock of a corporation which is in control
of the acquiring corporation), of stock of another corporation if, immediately after the
acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such other corporation (whether or
not such acquiring corporation had control immediately before the acquisition).
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(2)(E) provides that a statutory merger or
consolidation
shall not be disqualified [from being a tax-free reorganization] by reason of the
fact that stock of corporation . . . which before the merger was in control of the
merged corporation is used in the transaction, if-
(i) after the transaction, the corporation surviving the merger holds substan-
tially all of its properties and of the properties of the merged corporation (other than
stock of the controlling corporation distributed in the transaction); and
(ii) in the transaction, former shareholders of the surviving corporation ex-
changed, for an amount of voting stock of the controlling corporation, an amount
of stock in the surviving corporation which constitutes control of such corporation.
89. It has been suggested that California tax enforcers will take a "substance over
form" approach where "step transactions" have been used to avoid sales tax in cases
where it would otherwise apply to capital transactions. Gobar, California Sales Tax Prob-
lems In Disposing of a Close Corporation, 1967 So. CAL. TAX INSTITUTE 91, 111-12.
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There is also an argument to be made in the other principal
type of triangular reorganization, under section 368(a)(2)(D) of
the Internal Revenue Code, pursuant to which the acquired cor-
poration is merged into a new corporate subsidiary.0 Using our
earlier example, Flower, Inc. would merge into the new company.
Here, it is clear that both title and possession of tangible personal
property have been transferred. The argument for non-taxability
would rest on the fact that no consideration was paid by the
entity which is in fact the legal purchaser. In such a transaction,
the parent (General Gardens) of the legal purchaser (Greater
Flower, Inc.) has paid the consideration, but that entity (Gen-
eral) has been the transferee of no property other than corporate
stock. The actual transferee of the property, the new corporate
subsidiary (Greater Flower, Inc.), paid nothing to the transferor
(Flower, Inc.) either in stock or otherwise. Thus, the measure of
the tax is zero, and no tax can be due. Once again, this involves
heavy reliance on the legal form of the transaction and therefore
the language of the statute must be strictly followed. Such an
approach should be justifiable, given the highly technical manner
in which the Act is now being applied.
A more standard type of capital transaction, a corporate sta-
tutory merger under section 368(a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue
Code,91 in which former stockholders of the merged corporation
receive stock of the surviving company, is allegedly taxable under
the 1972 opinion. Suppose Flower, Inc. merged into General Gar-
dens Corp. directly, with A and B receiving General stock. The
Retail Sales Tax Division would presumably argue that sales tax
was collectible by them to the extent that taxable property was
transferred to General. There are substantial weaknesses, how-
ever, in that position. First, A and B have "sold" their stock in
Flower, Inc., if in fact they have sold anything. Second, title and
possession of the taxable property was in their corporation, not
in them, and that entity received no consideration for the trans-
90. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (2) (D) defines another type of reorganization
which will be exempt from taxation under section 354. The definition states that:
[tihe acquisition by one corporation, in exchange for stock of a corporation . . .
which is in control of the acquiring corporation, of substantially all of the properties
of another corporation which in the transaction is merged into the acquiring corpo-
ration shall not disqualify a transaction [as a tax-free reorganization] if (i) such
transaction would have qualified . . . if the merger had been into the controlling
corporation, and (ii) no stock of the acquiring corporation is used in the transaction.
91. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (A) provides that the term "reorganization"
includes "a statutory merger or consolidation."
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fer, producing a zero tax payable by the true vendor. Finally,
transfer of title is by operation of law, although the "sale" defini-
tion in section 324(d) of the Act may be so broad as to include
such a transfer. Similar objections could be raised in certain in-
stances involving articles of sale or of consolidation.
A final type of capital transaction is the sale of all of the
assets of a business, and here, arguments against the levy of a
sales tax or methods of avoiding it are not readily apparent. Such
a sale by a corporation might be free of income tax under section
368(a)(1)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code," but it is difficult to
see why the sales tax would not apply with respect to the transfer
of tangible personal property included in the group of assets,
absent a broad casual sale exemption. Not only must one consider
the Kaiser case and its predecessors, but also the fact that this is
a transaction subjected to sales tax under similar statutes in
other states.93 One technique to reduce the tax due on such a
92. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C) defines another form of tax-free reorgan-
ization under section 354 as:
[tihe acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corpora-
tion which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all of the
properties of another corporation, but in determining whether the exchange is solely
for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or
the fact that property acquired is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded.
93. Particular attention to this type of capital transaction is given by the authors
of two articles which have considered the application of the California sales tax. The first
is Sato, The Sales Tax and Capital Transactions, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 450 (1957) [hereinafter
referred to as Sato]; the second is Gobar, California Sales Tax Problems in Disposing of
a Close Corporation, 1967 So. CAL. TAX INSTITUTE 91, a somewhat more limited discussion.
The Sato article was written as a consequence of two California cases on the sales
taxation of the sale of an entire business, Sutter Packing Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
139 Cal. App. 2d 889, 294 P.2d 1083 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Market Street Ry. v. California
State Bd. of Equalization, 137 Cal. App. 2d. 87, 290 P.2d 20 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955). Market
Street was primarily engaged in operating a street railway in San Francisco, but it had
made some 900 separate retail sales between 1933 and 1948. These were predominantly
sales of obsolete equipment; however, one, in 1944, involved the sale of all of its operating
property to San Francisco. After the sale to the city, Market Street ceased its business
and made additional sales in liquidation of its remaining property. The receipts from the
sale to the city were over $2,500,000, while the gross receipts from the other property sales
were approximately $100,000. See Sato at 458.
In 1949, California assessed a deficiency against Market Street with respect to all of
the sales, including the bulk sale of its operating assets. The article notes that the sale to
the city was clearly a retail sale under the statute, and Market Street was equally clearly
a retailer thereunder. Sato at 459. Market Street argued that the sales tax did not contem-
plate taxing the receipts from the sale of the business, but since the court could find no
exemption in the statute for such a transaction, it held that Market Street was subject to
the tax.
The article seems to interpret this decision as an extension of Bigsby v. Johnson, 18
Cal. 2d 860, 118 P.2d 289 (1941), which applied the tax to the sale by a printer of a piece
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transfer could be an effort by the purchaser to minimize the con-
sideration allocated to taxable property; this will be limited to
some extent by income tax considerations encouraging substan-
tial allocations to obtain a high depreciable basis in the newly
purchased property.
A PERMANENT SOLUTION
There are other arguments which could be made and other
methods of structuring transactions which could be developed to
limit the application of the tax. For decades lawyers have been
devising sophisticated techniques to minimize income taxes, and
the economic effects of the sales tax may be sufficiently severe to
warrant the same creative efforts. One must ask, though, whether
or not such elaborate planning should be required when dealing
with the retail sales tax. The obvious answer is that it should not.
of used equipment incidental to his business, since the seller was in a retail business and
there was no exemption for any kind of sale made by such a seller. That was decided prior
to the incorporation of a casual sale exemption in the statute, as was the Market Street
case.
The second of the California cases was, however, decided under the revised sales tax
law which included this exemption. Sutter Packing was a fruit and vegetable processor
and distributor. Between 1945 and 1949 it made several retail sales of used equipment and
supplies on which a sales tax was paid. On one occasion it also sold all of its equipment
for a substantial sum and paid the sales tax thereon. In 1949, it transferred inventory to
an affiliated company and sold all of its remaining operating assets to an unaffiliated
company for a very substantial price. During the months preceding this sale and termina-
tion of its business, it had also made approximately eleven other retail sales.
Sutter argued that it was not a retailer when the last sale was made and also that
sales in liquidation were not taxable. The court disagreed, holding that it was still a
retailer through the last sale, since negotiations for that sale had commenced immediately
after its decision to discontinue business, and it was merely one in a series of sales made
in liquidation. Consistently, the court found nothing in a sale in liquidation to distinguish
it from any other taxable sale, when it was merely one of a series of taxable sales.
The Sutter Packing decision in some respects reflects the same line of reasoning which
appears in Kaiser and ACF. Neither Maryland case cited this decision, and of course the
Maryland statute did not include a "number, scope and character" test in the previously
extant casual sale exemption. Nonetheless, the thrust of these decisions is, in effect, to
include such a test in the old casual sale rule, at least when considering the application
of the sales tax to the sale of an entire business.
Sato is considerably troubled by the poor draftsmanship of the California occasional
sale exemption and the definite inequities which it caused. Sato, supra, at 462-67. He
agrees nonetheless that, absent an amendment to the statute, the decision in Sutter
Packing is probably a correct interpretation of that exemption. There has been no amend-
ment since the time of that article which clearly exempts sales of a business. It has been
noted, without any comment on the inherent inequity, that the sale of a business by a
retailer (anyone required to hold a seller's permit) will trigger the application of the sales
tax, even though a similar sale by one not required to hold such a permit would be free of
that tax. See Gobar, supra at 92-93, 99. See also Evans v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, CCH
STATE TAX REP., IDAHO 15,494 (1973).
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The statute should be amended to eliminate both the confusion
and uncertainty as well as the need for schemes and avoidance
techniques, however legitimate they may be.
One alternative would be to amend the casual sale exemp-
tion back to its original form, with the addition of a new provision
to impose the sales tax on sales of mobile homes. The desire of
the Retail Sales Tax Division to tax such sales seems to have been
the basis for the original amendment of the casual sale exemp-
tion, and this suggestion would yield that result without creating
a confused legal situation as to other transactions. This would
also place the Maryland Sales Tax in conformity with the stat-
utes of other states which impose a sales tax-a desirable result
if we wish to encourage interstate commerce and the use of Mary-
land as a corporate legal home for national companies. All of the
states which impose a sales tax apparently provide a meaningful
exemption for most casual or occasional sales except Colorado,
New York, Oklahoma and Wyoming. 4
Despite this widespread adoption, no comprehensive discus-
sion of the occasional and isolated sale exemption has been found.
The existence of such an exemption is mentioned only in passing
in the most recent legal treatise on this subject. 5 Due treats the
exemption in less than a page, stating as follows:
Sales made by persons other than regular vendors are
defined as "casual", "isolated", or "occasional" sales ...
Most states also exempt casual sales by business firms, that
is, sales of equipment and other items not normally handled
in the course of business. Such sales are taxed, however, in
Arizona, Georgia (if the annual figure exceeds $500), Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland (if the annual figure exceeds
$1,000), Nevada, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin,
and the District [of Columbia], plus the three states taxing
all casual sales [Colorado, New York and Oklahoma].
A number of states encounter difficulty with exemption
of motor vehicles ...
As noted, casual sales are usually defined to be sales by
persons other than those offering the goods for sale in the
ordinary course of business. Some variation exists in inter-
94. P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAX SERVICE SALES TAXES, ALL STATES 92,953 (1973)
(hereinafter referred to as P-H SALES TAXES). Due, [supra note 5, at 79-80] claims the
exemption is provided in some form by all of the states except Colorado and New York,
although he concedes that Oklahoma's exception is limited.
95. J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 486-87 (1969).
96. DuE, supra note 5, at 79-80.
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preting this rule, but the general idea is relatively standard:
status as a vendor depends upon whether there are regular
sales . . ., solicitation of regular business, maintenance of a
place of business, and similar considerations."
Given Due's misconstruction of the Maryland exemption, it is
possible that his other legal conclusions are erroneous; however,
his statement of the "general idea" is relatively accurate."
Basically, the exemption is statutory, definitional, regula-
tory or administrative, or judicial. An example of the statutory
exemption is found in the Maryland law." Definitional exemp-
tions arise through the definition of various terms in the sales tax
statutes. For example, the Kansas law defines the term "busi-
ness" to exclude the isolated .or occasional sale of tangible per-
sonal property by a person not engaged in the business of making
such sales.9 An example of a regulatory or administrative exemp-
tion can be found in Alabama. That sales tax statute'0 provides
no exemption for casual sales per se and imposes a tax on all
"retailers" of tangible personal property. The definitions are such
that casual and isolated sales could be included. The State De-
partment of Revenue, however, has promulgated a sales tax rule
which exempts casual and isolated sales by persons not in the
business of selling.'01
Finally, an example of the creation of a casual sale exemp-
tion by judicial action can be found in Georgia. As is the case in
Alabama, the Georgia statute'02 provides no specific exemption
97. See Des Moines & Central Iowa Ry v. State Tax Comm'n, 253 Iowa 994, 115
N.W. 2d 178 (1962), concerning the meaning of an occasional and isolated sale exemption.
There the court found the Iowa sales tax rule exempting casual sales to be without statu-
tory foundation and therefore invalid. The taxing statute which was in existence at that
time imposed a two percent tax upon the gross receipts from all sales of tangible personal
property. See ch. 196, § 2, [1937] Iowa Laws 410. There was no statutory casual sale
exemption. While the statute [Ch. 196, § l(f), [1937] Iowa Laws 410] did define gross
receipts as the total amount of sales of retailers, the court adopted an interpretation which
made the tax anplicable to all sales of tangible personal property. See also Note, Taxation:
Application of Sales Tax To Occasional and Isolated Sales, 12 DRAKE L. REv. 81 (1962).
At the present time, the Iowa law does provide a statutory exemption for the gross receipts
from casual sales. IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.43 (1971).
98. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 326(e) (1969). For other examples see CAL. REv. & TAX
CODE § 6367 (1970); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2602, 47-2605(h) (1968); MINN. STAT. § 297A.
25(k) (1972).
99. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3602(j) (1969). Similarly, the Utah law defines "retail
sale" to exclude isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in business.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-15-2(e) (Supp. 1973).
100. ALA. CODE tit. 51, §§ 786(2)-(36) (Supp. 1971).
101. P-H SALS TAXES, ALA. 22,276 (1973).
102. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92-3402a-3403a (Supp. 1972).
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for casual sales; rather, it taxes every person engaged in the busi-
ness of selling tangible personal property, and it broadly defines
business in the same manner as the Maryland statute. In Novah
v. Redwine,'°3 the Georgia court determined that the legislature
did not mean to tax a casual or isolated sale, since the definition
of the term "business" implied a continuity of transactions and
not a single transaction.
The statutory exemption is obviously the most desirable for
both taxpayers and tax collectors. Such an exemption is definite
and hopefully clear and determinative. A reinstatement of the
pre-1969 Maryland law would thus be beneficial for all concerned
parties.
Unfortunately the realities of taxation must be faced. With
the 1969 amendment, a grand and fertile field of tax revenues was
opened. To return to the prior law would once again close off this
area, and the tax authorities will probably be unwilling to lose
this source of revenue. As an alternative, a new exemption deal-
ing specifically with capital transactions could be added to sec-
tion 326 of the Act. This type of legislative action may be more
easily obtained, and therefore an examination of the law in other
states will be of value in determining the scope and form of such
a capital transaction exemption. Most states have not dealt with
this question under their sales tax, probably due to the existence
of broad casual sale exemptions. Where the issue has been consid-
ered, the treatment falls into one of five categories. These are:
first, a statutory exemption for most capital transactions; second,
statutory exemption for capital transactions in which ownership
interests are of a continuing nature; third, statutory casual sale
exemption made applicable to capital transactions by rulings or
decisions; fourth, non-statutory casual sale exemption made
applicable to capital transactions by rulings or decisions; and
finally, imposition of sales tax on capital transactions. Those
states which provide specific exemptions in their sales tax stat-
utes allow exemptions for many kinds of capital transactions. The
statutes of New York, New Jersey and Oklahoma are all examples
of this technique. New York does not have a casual sale exemp-
tion, either in its statute or administrative regulations, and no
judicial decisions have implied such an exemption. However, the
term "retail sale" is defined so as to exclude the following types
of transactions: the transfer of tangible personal property to a
103. 89 Ga. App. 755, 81 S.E.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1954).
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corporation, solely in consideration for the issuance of its stock,
pursuant to a merger or consolidation effected under the law of
New York or any other jurisdiction; the distribution of property
by a corporation to its stockholders as a liquidating dividend; the
distribution of property by a partnership to its partners in whole
or partial liquidation; the transfer of property to a corporation
upon its organization in consideration for the issuance of its
stock; and the contribution of property to a partnership in consid-
eration for a partnership interest therein. 4 This list of exemp-
tions does not include all capital transactions, and a reported
Opinion of Counsel to the New York Tax Bureau emphasized that
the statutory exemptions are limited to their terms.0 5
The New Jersey statute is basically the same and contains
five exclusions, pertinent to this discussion, from the definition
of "retail sale."'0 6 These provisions exempt transfers of tangible
personal property to a corporation solely in consideration for the
issuance of its stock, pursuant to a merger or consolidation; in a
distribution of a liquidating dividend by a corporation; in a distri-
bution of the property of a partnership to its partners in partial
or full liquidation of the partnership; to a corporation upon its
organization, in consideration for the issuance of its stock, and to
a partnership in consideration for a partnership interest therein.
There do not appear to be any regulations, rulings or cases which
have construed this statute.
The last jurisdiction which has been selected for analysis is
Oklahoma, which has a much broader statutory exemption for
capital transactions.' 7 Under this statute the following transfers
of tangible personal property are exempted from the sales tax:
transfers from one corporation to another corporation pursuant to
a reorganization;0 8 transfers in connection with the winding up,
104. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(4)(ii) (McKinney 1966).
105. 1 OP. COUNSEL N.Y. TAX BUREAU 46 (1967), P-H SALES TAXES, N.Y. 23,206
(1973). This involved a corporate reorganization pursuant to INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 368(a)(1)(C) in which a New York corporation transferred its assets to a Delaware
corporation in exchange for shares of stock of the acquiring company and the assumption
of liabilities. The shares of stock of the acquiring company were distributed to the share-
holders of the New York corporation, which was then liquidated. The opinion of counsel
held that since this transaction was not consummated pursuant to a statutory merger or
consolidation, the exemption in the statute did not apply to the consideration received
by the New York corporation for tangible personal property transferred in the
reorganization.
106. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 54:32B-2(e)(3)(B)-(F) (Supp. 1972).
107. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1305a (Supp. 1972-73).
108. A reorganization is defined to mean (i) a statutory merger or consolidation, or
(ii) the acquisition by a corporation of substantially all of the properties of another corpo-
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dissolution or liquidation of a corporation, but only when there
is a distribution in kind to the shareholders of the property of
such corporation; transfers to a corporation for the purpose of
organizing such corporation, where the former owners of the prop-
erty transferred are, immediately after the transfer, in control of
the corporation, and the stock or securities received by each is
substantially in proportion to his interest in the property prior to
the transfer; transfers to a partnership in the organization of the
partnership, if the former owners of the property transferred are,
immediately after the transfer, members of the partnership and
their interests therein are substantially in proportion to their in-
terests in the property prior to the transfer; and finally, transfers
from a partnership to members thereof when made in kind in
dissolution of the partnership. Once again, there do not appear
to be any regulations, rulings or decisions which have interpreted
these exemptions.
A more limited type of statutory exemption, one which re-
flects to some degree the incorporation or partnership formation
exemptions of the Oklahoma law in requiring continuity of pro-
portional interests, is found in Georgia."°9 This statute provides
that the sales tax shall not apply to sales, transfers or exchanges
of tangible personal property made as a result of a business reorg-
anization, provided that the owners, partners or stockholders of
the business being reorganized maintain the same proportional
interests or shares in the new organization. Similarly, a California
statute" provides that the term "occasional sale," a type of sale
exempt from sales taxation under that statute, shall include:
Any transfer of all or substantially all the property held
or used by a person in the course of. . . [activities for which
a sales tax seller's permit is required] when after such trans-
fer the real or ultimate ownership of such property is sub-
stantially similar to that which existed before such transfer.
For the purposes of this section, stockholders, bondholders,
partners, or other persons holding an ownership interest in a
corporation or other entity are regarded as having the 'real
or ultimate ownership' of the property of such corporation or
other entity."
ration when the consideration is solely all or a part of the voting stock of the acquiring
corporation, or of its parent or subsidiary. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1305a (Supp. 1972-73).
109. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3403a(c)(2)(K) (Supp. 1972).
110. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6006.5 (West 1970).
111. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 6006.5(b) (West 1970). Subsection (a) thereof is simi-
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The third category of jurisdictions which have considered the
sales tax implications of capital transactions have exempted such
transactions from sales tax by application of a statutory casual
sale exemption. This was accomplished judicially in Utah, where
lar to the casual sale exemption which existed in Maryland prior to the recent amend-
ment, and it includes within that term:
A sale of property not held or used by a seller in the course of activities for
which he is required to hold a seller's permit or permits or would be required to
hold a seller's permit or permits if the activities were conducted in this state,
provided such sale is not one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope and
character to constitute an activity for which he is required to hold a seller's permit
or would be required to hold a seller's permit if the activity were conducted in this
state ...
A recent regulation however, has expanded the application of this statute. Regulation 1595
incorporates a number of prior letter rulings reprinted in the sales tax services. Reported
at P-H SALES TAXES, CALIF. 21,222-A (1973), it is headed, "Occasional Sale - Sale of a
Business - Business Reorganization." Subpart (b) is concerned with the sale or reorganiza-
tion of all or part of a business, and it provides as follows:
(1) General. Tax applies to that portion of the gross receipts from the sale of a
business that is attributable to the transfer of tangible personal property held or
used in the course of activities [for which a seller's permit is or would be required]
and acquired by the purchaser for use rather than resale, as, for example, showcases
and office equipment. Tax does not apply, however, with respect to tangible per-
sonal property such as stock in trade, sold for the purpose of resale in the regular
course of the purchaser's business.
(2) Transfers of substantially all property without substantial change in owner-
ship. Tax does not apply to a transfer of all or substantially all the property held
or used by a person in the course of activities for which he is required to hold a
seller's permit or permits or would be required to hold a seller's permit or permits
if the activities were conducted in this state, provided that after the transfer the
real or ultimate ownership of the property is substantially similar to that which
existed before such transfer. "Substantially all of the property" means 80% or more
of all the tangible personal property held or used in the course of activities, includ-
ing tangible personal property located outside of this state. Stockholders, bondhold-
ers, partners, or other persons holding an ownership interest rather than a security
interest in the corporation or other entity are regarded as having the real or ultimate
ownership of the property of the corporation or other entity.
The real or ultimate ownership is substantially similar to that which existed
before a transfer if 80% or more of that ownership of the tangible personal property
is unchanged after the transfer . ...
(3) Statutory merger or consolidation. Tax does not apply to a transfer of
property of a constituent corporation to a surviving corporation or new corporation
pursuant to a statutory merger or consolidation under. . . the California Corpora-
tion Code or similar laws of other states.
(4) Contribution to commencing corporation or commencing partnership. Tax
does not apply to a transfer of property to a commencing corporation or commenc-
ing partnership in exchange solely for first issue stock of the commencing corpora-
tion or an interest in the commencing partnership. Tax does apply, however, if the
transferor receives consideration such as cash, notes, or an assumption of indebted-
ness, and the transfer does not otherwise quality for exemption. The tax is mea-
sured by the amount of such consideration attributable to the tangible personal
property transferred.
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it was held that the sales tax did not apply to the sale of an entire
business which included the transfer of tangible personal prop-
erty." 2 As noted earlier, that decision was based on an analysis
of the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.
Florida's law presents a similar approach but reaches a dif-
ferent result. The Florida sales tax law defines "business" to
exclude occasional or isolated sales involving tangible personal
property by a person not holding himself out as engaged in busi-
ness." 3 An administrative interpretation"' exempts some but not
all business liquidation sales under this statutory provision. The
rule states that the sale by a farmer of farm machinery or equip-
ment, or by a fisherman of a boat or by a grocery store of fixtures
would be exempt because the sellers involved are not engaged in
the business of selling tangible personal property of a similar
type. By contrast, it holds that a dealer in office equipment,
furniture or appliances cannot make an exempt occasional or
isolated sale when selling the furniture, fixtures and equipment
involved in the operation of a business; this is because of the
"definite similarity" between the commodity sold at retail and
the equipment sold in liquidation of the business."5
A final example of interest in this category is the Iowa law,
which was amended in 1963 following the decision in Des Moines
& Central Iowa Railway v. State Tax Commission. "I The amend-
ment added a statutory exemption for casual sales and also pro-
vided a definition of that term."7 The exemption has been the
subject of two reported administrative rulings."'
While all of these rulings are concerned with the taxability
of the sale of a business, the clear implication is that transfers on
the formation of a business should also be exempt from sales tax.
112. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
113. FLA. STAT., § 212.02(9) (West 1971).
114. P-H SALES TAXES, FLA. 21,582, rule 318-1.37(2) (1973).
115. Id. The commentary on this rule in P-H SALES TAXES, FLA., notes that there is
no specific mention in the law or regulations exempting the sale of an entire business, but
it interprets the rule to exempt from taxation the sale of all businesses except those which
consist of retail operations.
116. 253 Iowa 994, 115 N.W.2d 178 (1962).
117. IowA CODE §§ 422.42.12, 422.45.6 (1971).
118. A letter from the division of retail sales and use tax dated May 13, 1973,
reprinted in P-H SALES TAXES, IOWA 21,225.10 (1973), implies that no tax would be due
on the sale of an entire business, whether the seller was a retailer or otherwise. An opinion
of the Attorney General of Iowa dated December 18, 1970,id. at 23,051, holds that the
casual sale exemption would apply to the sale of tangible personal property by the owner
of a business who was liquidating that business, so long as he was not engaged in the
business of selling taxable goods for profit at the time of sale.
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When a sole proprietorship or partnership incorporates, the trans-
fer is presumably in liquidation of the business of the transferee;
and where a completely new business has been incorporated, any
transfers of property in exchange for stock would generally be
casual and isolated with respect to the transferor of the property.
Thus, in the states of Georgia, Utah and Iowa, as well as other
states which have statutory casual sale exemptions, most capital
transactions should be exempt from the sales tax, just as they
were in Maryland prior to the enactment of the amendment to
our casual sale exemption. As should be apparent.from the dis-
cussion of the Kaiser and ACF cases, about the only type of
capital transaction which was taxable in Maryland prior to 1969
was the sale of a business as part of a series of similar sales.
The fourth category of jurisdictions which are being consid-
ered treat capital transactions as exempt pursuant to administra-
tive or judicial interpretations of statutes that do not contain
casual sale exemptions. In Indiana, for example, there is no ex-
emption of any type, but the sales tax is made applicable only to
a sale at retail by a retail merchant."9 The statute implicitly
exempts the transfer of tangible personal property on the sale of
an entire business. 20
It has already been noted that the Georgia law, which con-
tains no casual sale exemption, does statutorily exempt capital
transactions where continuity of ownership exists. Sales of busi-
nesses are also now non-taxable by administrative adoption of a
judicially created casual sale exemption. The Georgia courts first
established that the statute could not tax casual sales, which
included the sale of an entire business, 2' and there now exists an
administrative provision incorporating this principle. 2 2 It states
that a sale in complete and bona fide liquidation is a casual sale
exempt from the tax if it is made within a thirty day period or
during such longer period as may be approved by the Commis-
sioner of Revenue. 2 3
A limited exemption for capital transactions has been devel-
oped by case law in Missouri, without reliance on a casual sale
119. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64.2651 (Supp. 1972).
120. See generally P-H SALES TAXES, IND. 21,222 (1973). A recent administrative
ruling, 2 Ind. Rev. Digest No. 4 (Oct. 1, 1970), P-H SALES TAXES, IND. at 21,222.10, states
that the transfer of a private vehicle to a corporation as a contribution to capital does not
generate any sales tax liability.
121. See cases discussed at note 78 supra.
122. GEORGIA TAX REGS. §§ 560-12-1.07, 2(c), P-H SALES TAXES, GA. 21,616 (1973).
123. Id.
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statutory or administrative exemption. In National Dairy Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Carpenter,"4 the court held that the transfer of
certain tangible personal property by merger of a wholly-owned
subsidiary into its parent was not subject to the sales and use tax.
The decision turns on the definition of "purchase price," used in
defining the measure of the tax, which the court declared implied
a contract of sale or exchange. Since on the merger the transfer
was by operation of law and not by contract for sale or exchange,
the transfer was not taxable. This is basically the same approach
taken in the opinions of the Attorney General of Maryland her-
einbefore described which dealt with the recordation tax.
In the final category of other jurisdictions are those states
which have determined to impose a sales tax on some or all capi-
tal transactions, either with or without a statutory or other casual
sale exemption. Maryland, California and New York can be in-
cluded here to a limited degree, but the only state falling squarely
within this group is Colorado, in which state the sales tax statute
has no exemption and broadly defines taxable sales to include all
sales except those made for resale.'25 In Palmer v. Perkins,' the
court held that the sale of an entire business was a taxable trans-
action. There a laundry, cleaning and dyeing business had been
sold to the appellant, who had been held liable for use tax on the
equipment and supplies included in the sale. The court conceded
that this was a casual or isolated transaction, but it found that
all sales not within the category of wholesale sales (sales for re-
sale) are taxable retail sales unless specifically exempted and
that there was no specific exemption for the sale of the business.'27
Neither is there any exemption for other forms of capital transac-
tions.
CONCLUSION
While these jurisdictions are not the only states which have
considered the application of the salex tax to capital transactions,
they are representative of the various ways in which the tax has
been so applied. The majority of states with a sales tax have not
broadly applied the tax to capital transactions, either through
124. National Dairy Products Corp. v. Carpenter, 326 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1959).
125. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 138-5-2(6), 138-5-4(1)a (1963).
126. 119 Colo. 533, 205 P.2d 785 (1949).
127. See also Tobin v. Weed, 158 Colo. 430, 407 P.2d 350 (1965). There the court
reiterated that there was no exemption for isolated or casual transactions in the Colorado
sales or use tax.
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specific interpretation of the tax laws or through failure to assert
the application of the tax. By contrast the states of New York and
California have developed rather specific techniques to handle
this issue, which undoubtedly reflect the high volume of commer-
cial activity in those states.
If Maryland is going to provide a capital transactions exemp-
tion, it would seem wise to follow the format which was developed
in California. That approach recognizes the inequity of taxing
transactions where economic substance and equitable ownership
have not changed, but it also maintains some degree of tax neu-
trality. As the California law demonstrates, the result that only
some capital transactions are taxed is not necessarily an anom-
aly. Despite a considerable body of laws and regulations which
exempt a great many types of capital transactions, the California
sales tax is nonetheless applied to capital transactions which are
not specifically exempted. This again reflects the statutory
scheme by which most sales tax statutes are drawn-the tax ap-
plies to every type of transaction except those which are specifi-
cally exempted. Where discretion is placed in the hands of ad-
ministrators to determine, within the statutory exemptions, what
transactions are exempt-such as is the case in California and
Maryland-the rules can be interpreted to accommodate a vari-
ety of capital transactions. To reach this result, though, it is clear
that a statutory basis must first exist.
The California statutory and regulatory scheme provides a
general exemption for most capital transactions-incorporation,
formation of a partnership, statutory merger, and combinations
where interests are of a continuing nature-virtually all types of
transactions except the actual sale of assets to totally unrelated
third parties. This is premised on an occasional sale exemption
in the statute and an additional exemption for capital transac-
tions in which interests are of a continuing nature. Primarily, the
tax is applied to capital transactions involving businesses which
are otherwise liable for retail sales tax, but it can even be applied
to businesses not normally subject to the sales tax, if sufficient
sales of that type have been made in the period preceding the
sale. The results obtained are generally reasonable and logical,
and by adopting a similar approach, Maryland would benefit
from the years of experience during which California authorities
have refined their taxing tools.
It appears that attorneys in California as a matter of course
give careful consideration to the sales tax consequences of every
capital transaction, save perhaps those which fall squarely within
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the statutory or regulatory exemptions. The sales tax implica-
tions of business proposals are probably given only slightly less
attention than income tax consequences. Until the Maryland law
is amended, and thereafter if the California approach is adopted,
practitioners in this state will have to follow the same course and
give even closer scrutiny to the effect of sales taxes on capital
transactions.
